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Existing research investigating human judgment and decision making describes patterns of systematic 
biases in the way people process information and make decisions.  Framing effects, for example, 
demonstrate that logically equivalent alternatives presented in divergent linguistic frames can lead to 
systematically different choice outcomes; in general, people demonstrate a preference for risk-averse 
behaviour when information is framed positively and risk-seeking behaviour when information is 
framed negatively.  Similarly, the status quo bias describes a tendency for decision makers to 
maintain current or previous decisions when confronted with the availability of new options, 
demonstrating that people possess a predisposition to continue with established behaviour.  This 
research proposes that the goals a decision maker adopts and the hedonic tone of the stimulus being 
evaluated influence whether framing effects are observed; similarly, the past performance of the 
status quo and complexity of available options influence whether participants exhibit a preference for 
the status quo.  Using a survey-based experimental methodology, the aforementioned propositions are 
investigated by systematically manipulating characteristics of decision problems in order to reveal the 
mechanisms which influence the emergence of framing effects and the status quo bias.  The results 
demonstrate that when positive goals or stimuli are emphasized, usual framing effects are observed; 
that is, participants demonstrate a preference for risk-averse behaviour in the positive frame and risk-
seeking behaviour in the negative frame.  Conversely, when negative goals or stimuli are emphasized, 
participants fail to demonstrate the expected shift in risk-preference.  Past performance and 
complexity of the available alternatives are also shown to influence preference for the status quo; 
specifically, participants demonstrate greater preference for the status quo when past performance is 
strong compared to when it is weak, and when the number of available options is low compared to 
when it is high.  The findings of this research improve our understanding of how contextual factors 
influence shifts in preference and the emergence of decision making biases; moreover, the current 
research demonstrates the need for future research to consider the influence of situational and 
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Throughout our lives we are continually involved with decision making, the cognitive process of 
selecting a choice or action amongst a variety of alternatives.  The choices we make are shaped by our 
beliefs, our values, our past experiences, and other aspects of our internal selves; moreover, the 
unique situations we find ourselves in contain countless elements and artefacts likely to influence the 
objects and events we perceive, the way we process information, and ultimately how we value and 
choose amongst the options available to us.  Decisions are not selected in a vacuum, nor are they 
evaluated and selected independently of the others we are faced with; conversely, choices made one 
moment influence the situations and possibilities that follow.  Some choices are routine and come 
naturally to us, such as whether to drink coffee or tea or which shoes to wear in the morning, while 
others require deep thought and contemplation, such as deciding whether or not to switch careers or 
move to a new city.  Much of what leads us to make decisions depends on our observations of past 
choices; that is, the actions we have previously chosen—or witnessed others select—that have proven 
satisfactory (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1995).  If a person drinks coffee every morning of their adult 
lives, and is able to recalls pleasurable experiences on most such occasions, then opting to drink 
coffee again today is a choice requiring minimal thought.  Conversely, most people have limited 
experience deciding whether to accept a job in a new industry or in a new city, and so careful 
consideration must occur while evaluating the potential rewards and risks; that is, decision makers 
must contemplate whether it is preferable to accept a fairly riskless outcome—for example, by 
maintaining the status quo—or to instead attempt to achieve a more desirable outcome at the risk of a 
relatively less desirable outcome.  In other words, when making decisions, we must determine the 
level of risk we are willing to adopt. 
 
It is fascinating to consider that we are equipped with the cognitive capacity to accurately process the 
immeasurable number of choice situations that face us each day.  Assisting us with this task are 
cognitive heuristics—efficient information processing ―rules of thumb‖ which allow us to make quick 
judgments and provide us with the ability to rapidly perceive our environment and quickly determine 
action despite the limited resources of our brains (Pólya, 1956).  Heuristics allow us to process our 
everyday surroundings without fully perceiving all of the information available to us, thus permitting 
us to focus on the most highly salient cues which guide our thoughts and allow us to arrive at 
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judgments and decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1982a, 1982b).  
Existing research has demonstrated that cognitive heuristics play an important role in our ability to 
make decisions (Kahneman, 2003); research has also shown that heuristics lead to cognitive biases—
patterns of deviation in judgment which lead us astray from accurate perceptions of our environment 
and optimal outcomes in decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  Examples of biased 
thinking include the framing effect, which demonstrates that presenting the same information in 
different ways may lead people to arrive at divergent decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; 
Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986), and the status quo bias, which 
demonstrates that people tend to opt for the continuation of established behaviour rather than shifting 
to new behaviour (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988).  While 
much research has demonstrated that we suffer from consistent and predictable biases in our thinking, 
follow-up studies often reveal results somewhat divergent or weaker than the expectations set by 
established theories (Kuhberger, 1998).  Inconsistency amongst existing research findings raises the 
question of whether current theories are representative of all situations and contexts and thus whether 
results can be accurately generalized as fundamentals of human thought. 
 
One way to explain inconsistent research findings is to acknowledge the existence of structural 
differences amongst the studied problems; that is, most decision problems investigated in the 
literature contain similarities in design, whereas problems that fail to replicate the expected finding 
exhibit structural differences in composition or content (Kuhberger, 1998; Sher & McKenzie, 2006).  
If research confirming existing theories has been based on problems of high structural similarity, and 
if problems of different structures lead to divergent results, then the conclusions drawn by existing 
research may be limited and the findings should not be generalized as fundamental traits of human 
decision making and behaviour.  In their critical review of the framing literature, Levin, Schneider & 
Gaeth (1998) acknowledge that most decision studies focus on outcomes at stake which are of 
positive hedonic tone, while few studies investigating decision making when outcomes are of 
negative hedonic tone; that is, problems usually discuss stimuli having positive connotation in our 
minds—such as human lives, jobs, money, and other desirable assets.  Moreover, it has been 
acknowledged that while affect is recognized as an important element in many behavioural theories, 
the concept has not been recognized by most models of human judgment and decision making 
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007).  Similarly, the majority of decision scenarios imply 
that the goal is to increase the commodity and that past performance has been strong.  The lack of 
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consideration of negative stimuli, goals, and performance is a critical oversight by the literature, as 
existing research itself concludes that people more prone to risk-taking behaviour when content is 
described negatively (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); specifically, existing research describing framing 
effects concludes that when outcomes are defined positively people tend to demonstrate risk-averse 
behaviour, whereas when outcomes are defined negatively people tend to demonstrate a tendency 
towards risk-seeking.  Since the human mind is limited in its ability to perceive, process, and 
remember information (Miller, 1956), it is also natural that the complexity of a decision scenario 
might influence preferences. 
 
This thesis claims that contextual and situational factors—often controlled, but usually not 
systematically varied in decision research—can significantly influence the choice of decision makers, 
and thus the existence of framing effects and the status quo bias.  In other words, this research 
investigates the impact of contextual and situational factors on generally accepted cognitive biases.  
More specifically, this thesis proposes that the hedonic valence of elements within decision problems 
influence how we think about and evaluate decision problems.  It is expected that the consistency of 
goals and the desirability of the problem stimulus influence the existence and direction of framing 
effects.  Additionally, it is expected that past performance and problem complexity influence 
preference for the status quo alternative.  By investigating how decision making is influenced when 
problems focus on items having differing hedonic appeal, we can improve our understanding of how 
cognitive heuristics are applied by decision makers and when cognitive biases are most likely to 
emerge in decision making; such knowledge will allow us to improve the psychological accuracy of 
our models of human judgment and decision making in situations involving risk and uncertainty. 
 
This thesis begins by summarizing the literature on judgment and decision making, and continues 
with a discussion of a number of situational and contextual factors which might influence the way in 
which we process information and make decisions.  Various hypotheses are proposed to investigate 
the influence of situational and contextual factors on framing effects and the status quo bias.  A 
research methodology is then outlined which allows the propositions to be empirically tested and the 
results of the conducted studies to be analyzed.  Lastly, the major conclusions and limitations of this 





Judgment and Decision Making 
The literature on judgment decision making includes contributions from a variety of disciplines 
including mathematics, economics, psychology, health studies, linguistics, management, business, 
and other applied areas (Kuhberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998).  Most notably, there exist two 
perspectives through which decision making is commonly investigated: how decisions should be 
made versus how people actually make decisions in everyday situations.  Normative research is 
concerned with determining the optimal outcomes to be selected in decision scenarios under the 
assumption that consistency with established economic principles is to be maintained.  Research 
discussing economically optimal choice is highly valuable when alternatives are to be evaluated in 
precisely defined scenarios which permit adequate time for detailed analysis to occur; for example, 
normative approaches are useful when an engineer uses objectively measured input variables—such 
as load and distance—to determine the ideal span of a bridge.  Conversely, descriptive research seeks 
to explain how people actually make decisions in their daily lives; for example, to help predict 
whether that same engineer will choose to buy a ticket for a lottery.  While normative models 
determine the optimal outcomes in objective or highly structured situations, descriptive models focus 
on the subjective preferences decision makers demonstrate in actual behaviour.  The present research 
follows the descriptive approach to investigate individual decision making behaviour in uncertain 
situations; specifically, the studies that follow investigate existing models of decision making to 
explain how the context of a scenario might influence the preferences of individuals in situations 
involving risk and uncertainty. 
 
The current section summarizes the fundamental ways in which we process information—that is, 
through intuitive and complex judgment—and attempts to explain when we are most likely to apply 
each type of processing.  Expected utility theory, a basic normative model of decision making 
defining optimal economic choice in scenarios involving uncertainty, is then described.  Next, the 
seminal work on cognitive heuristics and biases is introduced to explain why, in practice, we do not 
necessarily make decisions in a purely economic sense.  Our perceptual dependence on reference 
points is then described followed by an introduction to prospect theory—a descriptive model of 
human decision making which attempts to improve upon expected utility theory.  Lastly, examples of 
framing effects and the status quo bias are presented. 
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2.1 Intuitive and Complex Judgment 
Much of actual human information processing and decision making lacks the precision that formal 
mathematical models describe.  While some human decision making involves complex and calculated 
structured analysis, the majority of our decision making relies on intuitive judgment; that is, our 
decisions tend to be derived from ―a complex set of interrelated cognitive, affective, and somatic 
processes, in which there is no apparent intrusion of deliberate, rational thought‖ (Hodgkinson, 
Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008).  Whereas structured decision making usually relies on processes 
of sequential steps to determine an optimal course of action, intuitive decision making is best 
described as instinctive and subconscious in nature.  Since intuitive decisions are achieved rapidly 
and without conscious consideration, processing information intuitively increases the reliance we 
place on our basic perceptual processes and limits our ability to perceive all aspects of our situation 
and environments.  That is, when making decisions intuitively, we lack adequate time to fully analyze 
the situation; as a result, only the most highly salient elements of our environment are perceived and 
considered prior to reaching a judgment and taking action (Kahneman, 2003).   
 
In order to process incomplete information, we apply cognitive heuristics—simple and efficient 
strategies which allow us to rapidly make near-optimal judgments using readily accessible 
information (Pólya, 1956).  Of course, when incomplete information is used to make decisions the 
possibility of systematic errors or biases arising in our thinking is greatly increased.   In fact, when 
situations are complex and nontrivial it has been demonstrated that all decision makers—including 
those who might be considered expert data analysts, such as those with formal training in statistics 
and economics—suffer from systematic errors in judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  That 
being said, an expert in a particular field does possess an ability to make intuitive judgments and 
decisions that differ from those of amateurs.  By incorporating proficient knowledge with established 
processing abilities, expert decision makers are able to perceive and process the information 
contained within their environments in a way that is more efficient than others.  The effectiveness of 
an expert‘s intuitive decision making processes results largely from his or her ability to recognize 
salient environmental cues and match them to existing knowledge derived from past experiences 
(Kahneman, 2003).  Through the collection of knowledge over time, decision makers develop the 
ability to make rapid decisions without verbalization or conscious awareness of the decision making 
process.  In fact, expert decision makers are often unable to explain why an intuitive decision has 
been made.  For example, it has been shown that chess grandmasters know the move they are going to 
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make so quickly after seeing a game board that it is not possible for their selection to have resulted 
from analysis of the possible moves; moreover, when asked why they have made their chosen move, 
they are unable to provide a reason (H. Simon, 1983, p. 133).  Intuitive decision making ability thus 
appears to result from a combination of ability to recognize environmental patterns subconsciously 
and experiences stored in memory (Frantz, 2003). 
 
It would thus appear natural for us to rely on intuitive judgment for tasks that are familiar or routine 
in our daily lives.  If a situation is common to us then we are likely to make sound judgments without 
deep consideration or even conscious thought; for example, there is little risk and minimal chance of 
regret in choosing to drink a cup of coffee in the morning if past experiences dictate that we do so on 
most mornings and we are able to recall satisfaction from doing so.  On the other hand, there are 
obvious risks and a significant chance of regret when making more complicated and less familiar 
decisions, such as whether to switch careers.  When making routine decisions we thus rely on our 
abilities to make decisions intuitively; meanwhile, when making more complicated decisions, we tend 
to follow a structured decision making process consisting of deliberative thought and more thorough 
analysis (Kahneman, 2003).   
 
Understanding that there exist two core categories of decision making processes that are 
complementary in nature raises the question of whether we naturally apply each process in an optimal 
manner.  While intuitive decision making is necessary for us to quickly and efficiently act in everyday 
situations, it also leads to the possibility of errors in judgment that occur due to misperception of the 
situation or simply due to us not noticing options divergent from the routine.  A key purpose of 
studying decision making is to obtain knowledge that allows us to benefit from the efficiencies of our 
intuition while correcting for the errors and biases to which we are commonly susceptible (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982b).  In order to establish a groundwork upon which we can further investigate 
decision making, it is necessary to discuss rationality in a strictly economical sense and to understand 
why we deviate from optimal economic outcomes when actually making decisions. 
2.2 Rational Economic Decision Making 
Expected utility theory, founded in the fields of economics and mathematical decision theory, is the 
dominant normative model of rational economic decision making under risk and uncertainty (Savage, 
1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  In economic theory, utility is an abstract concept 
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representing the relative value, based on a sum of satisfaction or benefit, an individual gains by 
consuming a good or service.  Utility can thus be used to compare the relative satisfaction obtainable 
from different options.  The expected utility of a set of uncertain outcomes is determined by 
calculating the probability-weighted sum of the possible values of utility.  When choosing amongst 
risky or uncertain options, expected utility theory proposes that decision makers compute and 
compare the expected values of the available alternatives, and rational decision makers are said to 
select the alternative having highest expected value.  While expected utility theory acknowledges that 
decision makers differ in their preferences by allowing for each to possess unique utility functions, 
the model does make other assumptions which limit the practical accuracy of the model‘s predictions; 
specifically, the model assumes that decision makers seek to recognize all possible alternatives 
available to them, have complete information of the potential outcomes, and consistently prefer the 
alternative having the highest economic payoff.  In practice, these assumptions do not always hold 
true and the calculated preferences suggested by expected utility theory often fail to predict decisions 
actually made. 
 
According to economic theory, decisions deviating from the predictions of expected utility theory are 
considered irrational since the preferences do not align with the option having highest economic 
value.  A common explanation for this result is that decision makers lack complete knowledge of all 
possible alternatives due to either an omission of information contained within the scenario or limited 
abilities to perceive and evaluate the information that is present.  In other words, people might select 
an irrational alternative due to the presentation of options rather than based on the likelihood of 
experiencing the actual costs and rewards being considered; that is, perception of information can be 
more important than the actual existence of such information.  It is thus possible for identical 
underlying information to be presented in ways that highlight different elements of the scenario, 
resulting in decision alternatives being perceived and valued in ways that deviate from perfect 
rationality.  Similarly, the preferences of an individual may not be rational according to economic 
axioms, thus leading to choices that are incongruent with rationality in an economic sense.  If 
presentation of information and preferences of individuals influence perception and evaluation of 
alternatives, then it cannot be assumed that decision makers calculate values of expected utility with 
perfect accuracy according to predefined axioms of economic theory; it thus becomes necessary to 
further investigate the underlying causes of such shifts away from economically rational preference. 
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2.3 Cognitive Heuristics and Biases 
Whereas economic models, such as expected utility theory, seek optimality when describing preferred 
outcomes, the existence of intuition suggests that human decision makers may not.  Due to the limited 
perceptual and cognitive resources we possess to understand and evaluate the elements of our 
environments, it is usually impossible to examine all possible options prior to proceeding with an 
action.  In reality, we tend to perceive only those elements that are most salient to us, and consider 
only those alternatives which are most accessible.  Humans thus sacrifice some level of rationality in 
order to accelerate information processing and decision making.  Conceptually, decision makers are 
said to demonstrate bounded rationality in that we behave rationally within the parameters of 
simplified models that capture the critical features of a problem scenario (H. A. Simon, 1957).  We 
are also considered to be satisficing in that we accept satisfactory solutions rather than seek optimal 
ones; that is, we tend to accept the first alternative that comes to mind that satisfactorily meets our 
needs rather than applying additional effort or resources to seek outcomes that are optimal.  Bounded 
rationality and satisficing help to explain the divergence between actual human decision making and 
rational economic models of choice.  Allowing us to act on the basis of incomplete information are 
cognitive heuristics, basic rules that permit us to process the information we perceive quickly; that is, 
they allow us to determine hypothetical solutions without performing full calculations of expected 
values of the alternatives.  By applying cognitive heuristics we are able to quickly make decisions, 
arrive at judgments, and solve problems when faced with complex situations and incomplete 
information.  Examples of fundamental psychological heuristics include representativeness, 
availability, and anchoring and adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 
Representativeness describes a phenomenon by which people judge the likelihood of a hypothesis 
being true by considering how much it resembles available data existing in memory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973).  That is, when an event is highly representative of salient experiences, the probability 
of that event being associated with the experience is judged to be higher.  Conversely, if an event is 
dissimilar to experiences existing in memory, then the probability of the event being associated with 
existing experiences is judged to be lower.  Stereotyping is an example of representativeness in which 
it is assumed that all members of a group are considered to be definable by an easily distinguishable 




The availability heuristic suggests that people base predictions of the frequency or probability of an 
event based on how easily instances or associations come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 
1974, 1982a).  Experience teaches us that instances of common events are recalled more quickly and 
easily than uncommon events; similarly, recent experiences are recalled more quickly and easily than 
distant experiences.  When accessing memory, people thus judge events that are recalled quickly as 
being more probable.  Moreover, events that are particularly vivid or emotionally impactful to a 
person are likely to be heavily weighted when judging the likelihood of an event occurring.  A 
decision maker is thus likely to judge the probability of an event occurring by assessing how often 
such an event has occurred in his or her past experience, or how emotionally salient that event was.  
As a result, people tend to overestimate the likelihood of recent, memorable, or vivid events. 
 
Lastly, anchoring and adjustment explains that people often place excessive reliance on one trait or 
element of information over others when making decisions (Chapman & Johnson, 1999); that is, 
decision makers often demonstrate a tendency to establish an initial approximation based on a starting 
reference point, and make adjustments to achieve a final answer.  As a result, the characteristic acting 
as a reference point will often be overweighted compared to other available attributes of information.  
The effect of anchors is often pervasive enough that irrelevant or uninformative starting points—such 
as random numbers, or other unrelated information—can systematically influence a decision maker‘s 
judgments.   
 
Cognitive heuristics are thus experienced-based techniques that permit people to make decisions and 
solve problems in an efficient way.  Heuristics are applied with the expectation of achieving a 
reasonable solution which satisfactorily meets the needs of the decision maker.  The use of cognitive 
heuristics to process information efficiently leads to the emergence of cognitive biases—instances of 
evolved mental behaviour describing tendencies for people to make errors in judgment or decisions 
due to underlying cognitive factors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  While structured decision making 
may suffer from biased judgments through the negative influence of cognitive heuristics, intuitive 
decision making tends to be more greatly affected due to the rapid and impulsive nature of such 
judgments.  Since intuitive decision making occurs quickly, there exists minimal opportunity to 
correct for errors that are made subconsciously.  Conversely, when analyzing a situation in detail, 




2.4 Reference Dependence of Choice 
Existing research has established that our perceptions are reference dependent; that is, the attributes 
we perceive in a situation are dependent on the context in which they are observed (Kahneman, 
2003).  It is logical to assume that $100 of cash would be comparatively more valuable to someone 
with no money than to someone who has lots of money; it thus follows that the utility obtained from a 
good is dependent on the current state of affairs.  Utility theory, however, is a reference independent 
model in that it assumes that utility is not related to the current state of wealth, thus contradicting this 
basic principle of perception.  To elucidate this observation, consider the decision scenario presented 
in Figure 2.1, in which a choice between two alternatives is presented to participants in two 
contrasting frames 
Figure 2.1 Reference dependence of choice 
Gains Frame [N = 100]: 
In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $1000.  Choose between: 
A) 50% chance of winning $1000 [16 percent] 
B) guaranteed gain of $500 [84 percent] 
 
Losses Frame [N = 100]: 
In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $2000.  Choose between: 
A) 50% chance of losing $1000 [69 percent] 
B) guaranteed loss of $500 [31 percent] 
 
Source: Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
 
In the first scenario, participants are awarded an initial bonus of $1000 and then asked to choose 
between a 50% chance of winning an additional $1000, or a guaranteed gain of $500.  Note that both 
alternatives have an expected value of $1500, and yet the majority of participants select the 
guaranteed gain.  In the second scenario, participants are awarded an initial bonus of $2000 and then 
asked to choose between a 50% chance of losing $1000 and a guaranteed loss of $500.  Again, both 
alternatives have an expected value of $1500, and yet in this case the majority of participants select 
the gamble.  This example clearly demonstrates inconsistency with utility theory, as participants 
exhibit a preference for risk aversion when evaluating positive prospects and a preference for risk-
seeking when evaluating negative prospects. 
 
The existence of cognitive heuristics and biases demonstrate that it is not always appropriate to apply 
normative models of decision making, such as expected utility theory, to explain how people actually 
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make decisions.  By defining the evaluation of alternatives from a strictly economical perspective, 
expected utility theory fails to acknowledge the situations in which human evaluation does not align 
with economic axioms (Tversky, 1975).  In order to evolve expected utility theory into the descriptive 
realm, prospect theory was developed as a psychologically realistic alternative able to model human 
decision making while accounting for various cognitive heuristics and biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); that is, the theory attempts to describe how people actually make 
decisions given our reference dependent perceptions and the existence of systematic biases in our 
thinking.  Prospect theory differs from expected utility theory in that it evaluates outcomes relative to 
a reference point rather than in absolute terms; the theory suggests that people‘s value functions are 
asymmetrical with respect to the reference point, causing gains and losses to be evaluated differently.  
The value function described by prospect theory, shown in Figure 2.2, is concave on the positive side 
and convex on the negative side, with outcomes perceived as being above the reference point 
evaluated as gains and outcomes perceived as being below the reference point evaluated as losses.  
The value function is thus s-shaped, with losses having a relatively larger impact compared to gains 
of equivalent magnitude.  Evaluations are thus dependent on the outcome‘s position relative to a 
specified starting point. 
Figure 2.2 Prospect theory value function 
 




In accordance with prospect theory, when evaluating gains and losses having equal magnitude, people 
are predicted to demonstrate risk-averse behaviour on the positive side and risk-seeking behaviour on 
the negative side; this follows since the relative importance of additional gains is less valuable than 
additional losses are hurtful.  Consider a situation in which a decision maker must select between a 
positive sure-thing and a positive risky-choice.  Since both options are perceived to be positive 
relative to the reference point, they are evaluated on the concave region of the value function.  The 
risky-choice option offers an opportunity for higher gains at the expense of returning to the zero 
reference point; however, since the curve becomes flatter further up the curve, additional gains 
become relatively less valuable.  Respondents thus lock in gains by selecting the sure-thing option 
because the possibility of not obtaining guaranteed gains is more harmful than the potential additional 
gains are valuable.  Conversely, consider a situation in which a decision maker must select between a 
negative sure-thing and a negative risky-choice.  Since both options are negative relative to the 
reference point, they are evaluated on the convex region of the value function.  The risky-choice 
option offers a chance to avoid a negative outcome at the expense of a possibly larger negative 
outcome; however, since the curve is initially very steep and becomes flatter, the possibility of 
avoiding the initial losses is more valuable than the additional losses are harmful, and so the majority 
of respondents opt to take a risk by selecting the risky-choice option. 
2.5 Framing Effects 
Framing effects exemplify the results modelled by prospect theory by demonstrating that the 
formulation of a decision scenario can alter a decision maker‘s interpretation of the available 
alternatives; in other words, framing effects reveal that logically equivalent options can lead to 
differing preferences in choice, with preferences between options shifting or reversing when 
information is presented in different ways.  In their review of the literature, Levin et al. (1998) define 
three broad categories of framing effects: attribute framing, goal framing, and risky-choice framing.  
Each of the three types of framing effects demonstrates that the way in which a problem is framed can 
influence the perceived attractiveness of the available alternatives, and the preferences of the decision 
maker.   
 
Attribute framing effects, perhaps the simplest form of framing effects, are demonstrated by 
highlighting either the positive or negative characteristics of an object or event.  Through framing the 
valence of a problem attribute, the information contained within a decision scenario is presented in 
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such a way that it accentuates either the attractive or aversive qualities of an object or event.  Such 
framing manipulations may apply to either the description of the decision scenario itself or the 
potential alternatives.  Attribute framing problems usually manipulate the perceived valence of a 
single attribute within a decision scenario, such as by asking a decision maker to either accept an 
event or reject an event, or by phrasing a gamble in terms of a potential gain or a potential loss.  For 
example, one study of attribute framing showed that perception of the quality of ground beef depends 
on whether the beef is labelled as ―75% lean‖ or ―25% fat.‖  Participants rated the product as better 
tasting and less greasy when it was described positively—in terms of leanness—compared to when it 
was described negatively—in terms of fattiness (Levin & Gaeth, 1988).  In general, attribute framing 
problems demonstrate that people are more likely to evaluate a situation favourably when it is 
described in positive terms rather than when it is described in negative terms (Levin et al., 1986; 
Levin, Snyder, & Chapman, 1988). 
 
Goal framing effects demonstrate that decision making is influenced by the implicit goals that a 
decision maker adopts; a goal framing problem might instruct the decision maker to maximize or 
minimize a commodity, therefore focusing attention on the desirability of seeing gains or avoiding 
losses.  In both cases the content of the problem remains identical; however, the phrasing of the goal 
is manipulated such that emphasis is placed on either the positive or the negative.  For example, the 
positive frame of a problem might state that ―studying for an exam increases performance‖ while the 
negative frame might state that ―not studying for an exam decreases performance.‖  In this case, the 
positive frame focuses the decision maker‘s attention on obtaining the positive outcome of strong 
performance, whereas the negative frame focuses attention on avoiding the negative outcome of weak 
performance.  In general, the results of goal manipulations show that people tend to be more highly 
motivated to avoid a loss than to obtain a gain; that is, when a problem is described in terms of 
negative outcomes, participants are more highly motivated to make decisions and take actions that 
actively seek to avoid losses, as doing so reduces the likelihood of experiencing undesirable outcomes 
(Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987)  
 
Risky-choice framing effects exemplify the tendency of decisions makers to prefer risk-averse options 
when alternatives are presented in the domain of gains, and risk-seeking options when alternatives are 
presented in terms of losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); that is, whether the options in a decision 
scenario emphasize the positive or negative aspects of the problem influences a decision maker‘s 
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willingness to take risk.  Of the various framing biases, the risky-choice framing effect is perhaps 
most prevalent in the literature, and will thus be discussed in the greatest detail.  A classic example of 
the risky-choice framing effect is Tversky & Kahneman‘s Asian Disease problem (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981).  The results of the Asian disease problem demonstrate that decision makers have 
inconsistent preferences when identical decision scenarios are presented using different phrasings of 
logically equivalent alternatives.  In the positive frame, the problem was presented in terms of the 
number of lives saved, thus highlighting the desirable aspects of the alternatives; a separate group of 
participants were presented with an identical decision scenario and a logically equivalent pair of 
outcomes presented in a negative frame.  In each case a pair of alternatives was thus presented which 
included a risk-averse option and a risk-seeking option having equal expected value; it was found that 
the preferences of participants were dependent on whether the available alternatives are described in 
positive terms or negative terms.  The complete problem and original results are presented in Figure 
2.3.   
Figure 2.3 Asian disease problem: a classic risky-choice framing problem 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to 
kill 600 people.  Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume the 
exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
 
 Positive Frame [N = 152]: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. [72 percent] 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved. [28 percent] 
 
Negative Frame [N = 155]: 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. [22 percent] 
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability 
that 600 people will die. [78 percent] 
 
Which of the two programs would you favour? 
Source: Tversky & Kahneman (1981) 
  
Most problems exemplifying framing effects contain alternatives which have equivalent expected 
values.  Moreover, the sure-thing and risky-choice options in the positive frame are usually equivalent 
to the sure-thing and risky-choice options in the negative frame.  In the Asian disease problem, for 
example, the scenario specifies that 600 lives are at risk.  In the positive frame the sure-thing option 
clearly states that ―200 people will survive‖ implying that the remaining 400 people will die.  In the 
negative frame, the sure-thing option specifies that ―400 people will die‖ implying that the remaining 
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200 people will survive.  Similarly, in the positive frame the risky-choice option specifies a 1/3 
probability that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved—resulting 
in an expected value of 200 lives saved.  Meanwhile, in the negative frame, the risky-choice option 
specifies a 1/3 probability that no people will die and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die—
resulting in an expected value of 400 people dying.  There thus exists equivalence between the 
options within each frame and also across frames.  Despite the logical equivalence amongst choice 
options, respondents demonstrate a preference for the risk-averse option in the positive frame and the 
risk-seeking option in the negative frame—resulting in a visible framing effect, or shift in preferences 
across frames. 
 
While Tversky & Kahneman do not explicitly express why the Asian disease problem is an important 
decision scenario to be investigated, the conclusions of the study have been widely accepted and the 
results generalized across contexts and disciplines.  Admittedly, there are limited methodological 
means through which appropriate subject matter and scenario formats can be determined, and it is 
difficult to find practical scenarios which can be generalized across all situations.  For this reason, 
studying decision making and establishing generalized conclusions is an inherently challenging and 
somewhat subjective task.  That being said, the seminal findings of Tversky & Kahneman do reveal 
that logically identical presentations of the same information can result in vastly different outcomes, 
contradicting the preferences predicted by expected utility theory; that is, manipulations in the 
wording of choice outcomes can cause decision makers to demonstrate a reversals in preference.  
Furthermore, the findings raise the possibility that decision makers remain unaware of the influence 
of framing on preference.  The results of the Asian disease problem are practically significant in that 
they demonstrate that decisions made by others can be influenced through strategic presentation of 
the underlying information; the findings are thus highly important in fields as diverse as consumer 
marketing, business negotiation, health care, dispute resolution, and others. 
 
Much research has expanded upon the foundational results defining the risky-choice framing effect.  
Social cues have been shown to influence priorities when making decisions; for example, research has 
shown that when the number of kin at risk is manipulated in the Asian disease problem, the 
preference for the risk-seeking alternative became more dominant as the number of kin in the 
endangered group increases (Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001).  Similarly, when variations of the 
Asian disease problem were asked in which the focus was extraterrestrial lives as opposed to human 
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lives, a framing effect was observed only in the human case but not in the extraterrestrial case, thus 
suggesting that framing effects exemplify the existence of a social dilemma that is context dependent.  
Existing research also demonstrates that the size of the potential payoff influences choice in risky-
choice problems, with participants more likely to opt for the sure-thing alternative when payoffs are 
larger compared to when they are smaller (Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002; Zhang 
& Miao, 2008).  It has also been shown that some research designs are more effective than others, 
with scenarios describing disease or financial considerations producing stronger results than scenarios 
discussing other issues (Kuhberger, 1998).  While numerous factors have been shown to influence the 
likelihood of observing framing effects, there exists strong evidence supporting a general tendency 
for people to prefer relatively risk-averse decisions when outcomes are framed in positive terms, and 
a relative tendency towards risk-taking when outcomes are framed in negative terms (Kuhberger, 
1998; Levin et al., 1998).  The majority of findings contained within the literature have, however, 
been somewhat weaker than those found initially. 
2.6 Status Quo Bias 
The status quo bias describes the tendency for decision makers to select the status quo alternative 
when confronted with the availability of new alternatives (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988); that is, 
decision makers exhibit a tendency towards continuing established behaviour rather than shifting to 
new behaviour.  In general, decision makers are likely to follow customary procedures and policies, 
purchase familiar products, continue in the same job, and maintain existing financial investments.  In 
the judgment and decision making literature, the status quo bias has typically been investigated 
through decision scenarios in which a set of predefined alternatives are available with one option 
being defined as the default, or status quo, option.  Across a range of decision scenarios, participants 
demonstrate a strong preference for the status quo option over the other available alternatives.  The 
status quo bias likely exists due to both economic and psychological reasons.  Decision makers might 
choose the status quo alternative for rational reasons, such as a desire to avoid perceived costs of 
switching away from the existing option; switching costs could include financial expenses associated 
with buying and selling products or investments, or non-financial costs such as the time required to 
gain familiarity with alternative options.  Psychological commitment to the status quo option might 




In general, people also demonstrate a desire to maintain cognitive consistency; that is, we behave in 
ways that maximizes the internal consistency of our cognitive structures and maintains that 
consistency through time (Newcomb, 1968, p. xv).  Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people 
prefer for their cognitions to be psychologically aligned (Festinger, 1957; Festinger & Carlsmith, 
1959); if two cognitions are dissonant with one another, such as saying one thing but believing 
another, or shifting away from a decision previously made, psychological tension will be experienced 
and there will be motivation to reduce the dissonance.  Another example of cognitive consistency is 
coherence theory, which suggests that we construct interpretations of our perceptions in ways that 
provide the most coherent account of what we want to understand; therefore, we perceive objects and 
events in ways that allow the information available to us to fit our interpretations better than alternate 
interpretations (Thagard, 2000; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998).  Cognitive consistency also explains 
that people who communicate regularly with one another tend to think similarly (Shiller, 2005, p. 
157).  In situations of uncertainty, people tend to conform to the norms that exist within the social 
structure; that is, we assume that others are acting sensibly and adjust our beliefs to match those of the 
people around us (Locher, 2002, pp. 25-30).  In other words, we not only seek coherence in our own 
thoughts and actions, but also strive to perceive the world in ways that are coherent with the views of 
others.   
 
Broadly speaking, we tend to value the same things that others around us do, which implies having 
needs that are comparable to those of others in our social groups.  In determining ways to satisfy 
those needs, we are likely to acquire goals and means from others as we observe others achieve their 
goals; specifically, the theory of conformism states that a subject who has neither the ability nor 
expertise to make decisions will leave decision making to the group and its hierarchy (Asch, 1955, 
1956).  For example, in the Asch conformity experiments (Asch, 1955, 1956), participants were asked 
questions about a set of lines after a group of confederates gave incorrect answers.  It was found that 
most participants gave incorrect answers that conform to the responses of the majority.  Similarly, in 
the Milgram experiment (Milgram, 1963, 1974), participants were instructed by an authority figure to 
perform acts that conflicted with their personal conscience.  It was found that when instructed by a 
person in a position of authority to perform actions, participants were willing to perform actions that 
they otherwise would not have done.  In many cases, the status quo alternative provided to a decision 
maker is not self-selected but is rather the result of the choice of another decision maker at a previous 
instance in time.  In both the Asch and Milgram experiments, a tendency towards conformity suggests 
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that a person‘s desire for coherence with the opinions of others can actually cause a shift towards 
uniform behaviour, and thus a shift towards the existing status quo alternative.  An alternative 
interpretation of the status quo bias would thus be that it summarizes the basic human tendency 
towards thoughts and actions that are coherent with the current and past actions of others. 
 
In the case of a status quo alternative, decision makers are guaranteed an outcome that, in most cases, 
offers familiar results and is thus perceived as certain.  In contrast, alternative options are often 
unfamiliar to the decision maker and are likely perceived as being relatively uncertain.  In order to 
avoid uncertainty, decision makers demonstrate a bias towards the status quo alternative.  That is, 
decision makers demonstrate a preference for the status quo since they perceive the disadvantages of 
shifting away from it as looming larger than the potential advantages obtainable through the 
alternatives (Kahneman et al., 1991).  For example, when purchasing a cereal at the grocery store it is 
very easy for a shopper to buy the same brand as he or she always does, because doing so is relatively 
riskless if experience dictates that such a selection has been satisfactory in the past.  Conversely, 
opting to move away from the status quo and select a different brand requires the adoption of greater 
risk since the decision maker can no longer guarantee that the product will be enjoyed.  While the 
new cereal may offer many benefits, and may in fact be preferred by the decision maker if he or she 
gives it a try, the perceived risks involved in making the switch will often prevail, thus preventing the 






Contextual Influence on Decision Making 
Through the amalgamation of research on psychological decision making and economic theory, 
prospect theory provides a descriptive model of decision making which improves the psychological 
realism of previous economic models.  That is not to say, however, that the psychological findings 
prospect theory incorporates are perfect portrayals of actual human behaviour.  If generally accepted 
biases in our thinking, such as framing effects and the status quo bias, do not appear as consistently in 
actual behaviour as existing research might lead us to believe, then there continues to be opportunity 
to further develop models of human judgment and decision making under risk and uncertainty. 
 
Existing definitions of psychological biases largely omit explanations of how situational and 
contextual cues might influence how decision makers interpret and act upon information contained 
within decision scenarios.  While the anchoring and adjustment heuristic clearly demonstrates a 
tendency for decision makers to establish initial approximations based on starting reference points 
contained within a scenario, this conclusion has not been widely acknowledged as a general tendency 
of human behaviour with regards to specific preference and decision making.  The status quo bias 
does, of course, demonstrate an example of information contained within the decision scenario 
influencing choice outcome; that is, the status quo bias demonstrates that our values and beliefs are 
not necessarily retrieved from memory, but may instead be constructed from environmental cues 
during the decision making process.  In making decisions, we thus rely not only on our internal 
memory but also our perceptions of our environments.  It is thus highly plausible that other 
information contained within our environment, besides the status quo, also have meaningful impact 
on our perceptions and our evaluations of the available alternatives.   
 
It is important to recognize that we perceive the world by creating representations of our environment 
through our limited perceptual abilities; that is, through our perceptions we build models of reality 
which influence what we believe to be true.  By definition, a model is a simplified description of a 
system, and therefore certain details must be excluded.  Our perceptual system relies on our use of 
cognitive heuristics to simplify a complex environment, and the heuristics we apply influence the 
elements of the world that we perceive.  Since our information processing abilities are limited (Miller, 
1956), it is unrealistic to assume that we are able to perceive everything, and so it is safe to assume 
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that our brains make simplifying assumptions while processing information and perceiving our 
environments (Koffka, 1935/1963, pp. 171-174).  The elements of our environments that we do 
perceive become an integrated part of our knowledge and are likely to influence our perceptual and 
cognitive processes.  Through perception of aspects of our environments as well as the behaviour of 
others, our values and goals influence how we value objects and events and thus have meaningful 
impact on the decisions we make.  Therefore, while problem framing and the status quo alternative 
influence choice, so to do other elements of the environment which are highly salient and 
significantly influence the beliefs we derive from a scenario. 
 
Prospect theory is tremendously successful in describing results that are consistent with framing 
effects; that being said, in accounting for some of the biased outcomes that result from our use of 
heuristics, the model must make assumptions which may be overly constraining and restrict its ability 
to apply in all situations.  For example, prospect theory does not consider the influence of 
motivational and social factors on the valuation of alternatives.  Moreover, prospect theory assumes 
that value functions are always s-shaped and therefore that certain relationships always exist between 
gains and losses without concern for the nature of the underlying commodity; that is, the theory does 
not explicitly acknowledge that items having different valence might be valued in different ways.   
Consideration of situational and contextual aspects of decision scenarios is thus outside the realm of 
existing theory and limits the real-world reliability of the descriptive model.  The ideas presented in 
this section explain a variety of ways in which situational and contextual aspects of a decision 
scenario might influence the choice of a decision maker.  The theory discusses how the goals defined 
within a scenario and the hedonic tone of a problem‘s stimuli might influence the emergence of 
framing effects; then, in a somewhat distinct but related discussion, the theory discusses the influence 
of past performance and the complexity of a problem on a decision maker‘s preference for the status 
quo alternative. 
3.1 Goals and Motivation 
Deci & Ryan (2000) define human needs as innate, organismic necessities essential for ongoing 
psychological growth, integrity, and well-being.  In order to satisfy our needs, we possess motivation, 
derived through either internal or external sources, which activates goal-oriented behaviour.  Factors 
influencing motivation include the basic human desire to minimize pain and maximize pleasure, the 
natural desire to avoid mortality, and a social desire to behaviour altruistically.  Intrinsic motivation 
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arises through rewards inherent to a task or activity itself, while extrinsic motivation emerges due to a 
desire to achieve something outside of oneself.  We are likely to become intrinsically motivated to 
perform a task if we can control the amount of effort we put in, have some control over the results, 
and are naturally interested in the topic, whereas we are likely to become extrinsically motivated if we 
possess a desire to obtain an external reward or avoid punishment.  In order to perform tasks in a way 
that allow us to satisfy our needs, the goals we possess motivate our behaviour by directing attention, 
regulating effort, increasing persistence, and encouraging strategic planning (Locke & Latham, 1990).  
In the case of multiple potential courses of action, goals direct attention by indicating how much 
effort should be focused on various elements of a task.  When obstacles exist, goals encourage us to 
persist by acting as a reminder as to why short-term efforts are being exerted.  Goals also encourage 
us to create strategies and action plans that provide us with a means through which we can achieve 
the things we desire.  It is important to recognize that goals are established and decisions made within 
the context of a larger society which influence our values and the resources available to us.  Social 
structures represent systems of rules, social norms, and sanctions which define the situations in which 
we live our lives (Bandura, 2001; Giddens, 1984).  When goals are aligned with those of others 
within the structure of the social system, we have additional resources available which may help us 
satisfy our needs (Earley, 1994); there thus exists motivation for us to set and maintain goals that are 
similar to those of others within our social groups.   
 
In the Asian disease problem, participants are assumed to possess an existing goal to save as many 
lives as possible.  The positive frame contains options described in terms of saving lives, an outcome 
that is congruent with the decision maker‘s goals; conversely, the negative frame describes options in 
terms of people dying; an outcome that conflicts with the decision maker‘s goals.  Desirable goals can 
thus be considered to have positive valence while undesirable goals can be considered to have 
negative valence.  The results illustrated by risky-choice framing problems reveal that when options 
have positive valence, participants demonstrate a preference for risk-aversion; whereas when choices 
have negative valence, participants demonstrate a preference for risk-seeking (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981).  Heath, Larrick, & Wu (1999) claim that goals serve as reference points which influence 
motivation and influence how outcomes are valued.  Moreover, McElroy & Seta (2007) have 
demonstrated that by explicitly manipulating goals within a decision task, the perceived valence of 
the alternatives is influenced, which impacts the likelihood and direction of framing effects being 
observed.  To test this proposition, the authors described a situation, portrayed in Figure 3.1, in which 
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an athlete‘s goal is to either increase, decrease, or maintain his or her weight.  For each scenario, 
participants were asked to make a choice between alternatives presented in either a positive or 
negative frame. 
Figure 3.1 Athlete weight problem: a risky-choice framing problem with explicit goals 
Imagine that you are an athlete with the goal of (decreasing; increasing; maintaining) your weight as 
much as possible. Because of your sport, at this juncture in the season, (the lower your weight the 
better you can perform; the higher your weight the better you can perform; your current weight is 
where you can perform best).  
 
 Positive Frame: 
If Program A is adopted, 20 pounds will be gained. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 60 pounds will be gained and a 
two-thirds probability that no pounds will be gained. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Program C is adopted, 40 pounds will be lost. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that no pounds will be lost and a 
two-thirds probability that 60 pounds will be lost. 
 
Which of the two programs would you favour? 
Source: McElroy & Seta (2007) 
 
In the athlete weight problem, goals have been explicitly defined and assigned to the participants.  In 
the case where the goal is to increase weight, the alternatives presented in the positive frame are 
aligned with the decision maker‘s goal and so the frame possesses positive valence; in contrast, the 
options in the negative frame oppose the goal and so the frame has negative valence.  Conversely, in 
the case where the goal is to decrease weight, the positive frame opposes the goal and the frame thus 
has negative valence, while the negative frame is aligned with the goal and so the frame has positive 
valence.  In summary, when goals are consistent with the available options the frame has positive 
valence, and when goals are inconsistent with the available options the frame has negative valence.  
Results of the study demonstrate that when the goal is to increase weight, a standard risky-choice 
framing effect consistent with existing literature is observed; that is, respondents demonstrate a 
tendency towards risk-aversion in the positive frame and risk-seeking in the negative frame.  
Conversely, when the goal is to decrease weight, respondents demonstrate a preference for risk-
seeking in the positive frame and risk-aversion in the negative frame; in other words, a framing effect 
opposite to that commonly found in the literature is observed.  Lastly, when the goal is to maintain 
weight, the goal lacks consistency with any of the outcomes, and no framing effect is observed.  That 
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is, neither a gain nor a loss of weight supports the goal; therefore, the framing of the problem does not 
significantly influence the choices of respondents.  The findings of McElroy & Seta are significant in 
that they demonstrate the importance of goals on decision making, especially with respect to risky-
choice framing problems.  The results of the problem, summarized in Table 3.1, demonstrate that the 
goals of a decision maker determine the valence of the frame and thus the likelihood and direction of 
the resulting framing effect. 
Table 3.1 Summary of framing effects in athlete weight problem 
Goal Frame Valence Conclusion 
Increase Positive Positive Framing effect 
 Negative Negative  
Decrease Positive Negative Reverse framing effect 
 Negative Positive  
Maintain Positive Ambiguous No framing effect 
 Negative Ambiguous  
 
To further clarity the results, consider that when the scenario defines a goal to increase weight, the 
positive frame describe outcomes that are inherently desirable for the decision maker; meanwhile, the 
negative frame describe outcomes that are inherently undesirable.  The outcomes within the positive 
frame are thus positively aligned with the subject‘s goal, while the outcomes contained in the 
negative frame are negatively aligned with the goal.  The interpretation of positive and negative 
frames is thus straightforward.  Conversely, consider the scenario in which the goal is to decrease 
weight.  Now the alternatives described within the positive frame are actually undesirable for the 
decision maker, and thus inherently negative in nature; meanwhile, the alternatives described in the 
negative frame are actually desirable to the decision maker, and thus inherently positive in nature.  In 
this case, the positive frame actually opposes the goal; consequentially, the frame is actually 
associated with a negative connotation.  In fact, the positive frame could be considered negative, and 
the negative frame considered positive.  If this interpretation is accepted, then what we actually 
observe when the goal is to decrease weight is a regular framing effect—no different from results 
already existing throughout the literature. 
 
One oversight of the McElroy & Seta study is that outcomes described within the positive frame are 
not logically equivalent to outcomes described within the negative frame; that is, the weight problem 
does not demonstrate a framing effect equivalent to that found in the Asian disease problem.  The 
reason for the inconsistency is that the described scenario does not explicitly specify how much 
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weight is ‗at risk‘, and there is thus no available benchmark to which participants can immediately 
compare the available options.  In the positive frame, the sure-thing option specifies that 20 pounds 
will be gained, whereas in the negative frame the sure-thing option specifies that 40 pounds will be 
lost—but these alternatives are not consistent since the decision scenario does not specify that 60 
pounds are at risk.  Similarly, in the positive frame the risky-choice option specifies a 1/3 probability 
that 60 pounds will be gained and a 2/3 probability that no pounds will be gained—resulting in an 
expected value of 20 pounds gained.  In the negative frame, however, the risky-choice option 
specifies a 1/3 probability that 60 pounds will be lost and a 2/3 probability that no pounds will be 
lost—resulting in an expected value of 40 pounds lost.  The problem thus exhibits logical equivalence 
between the two options within the positive frame—since both have an expected value of 20 pounds 
gained—and logical equivalence between the two options within the negative frame—since both 
options have an expected value of 40 pounds lost.  However, there is inequality between the expected 
value of options in the positive frame and the expected value of options in the negative frame, and so 
the different framings cannot be considered to be logically equivalent.  The results demonstrated by 
McElroy & Seta are thus not technically framing effects according to existing definitions.  Despite the 
aforementioned omission, the findings of McElroy & Seta do provide initial evidence that goals might 
influence preferences for risk and valuation of uncertain alternatives by decision makers; moreover, 
the results demonstrate that the existence and direction of framing effects may be dependent on a 
decision maker‘s goals.  In general, the study demonstrates that a goal to increase a commodity might 
promote a preference for risk-aversion in the positive frame and risk-seeking in the negative frame—a 
finding that is analogous with the expectations of the framing effect literature.  In contrast, a goal to 
decrease a commodity might promote a preference for risk-seeking in the positive frame and risk-
aversion in the negative frame—a finding consistent with the literature, assuming that one 
acknowledges that the valences of the frames have been reversed. 
 
The complexity involved with interpreting the weight problem demonstrates the limitations of the 
language used by existing literature to describe risky-choice framing problems.  We have thus 
revealed an additional difficulty with the results of the weight problem in specific, and the greater 
literature as a whole.  Whether an alternative should be considered positive or negative is dependent 
on the goals of a decision maker.  The weight problem demonstrates that goals determine the 
attractiveness of alternatives from the perspective of a decision maker; the problem also demonstrates 
the need for language used within the literature to be more clearly defined if we wish to improve our 
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understanding of framing effects.  An alternate way to explain the results is to say that participants 
demonstrate a tendency towards risk-aversion when outcomes are aligned with inherent goals, and a 
tendency towards risk-seeking when outcomes oppose goals.  In other words, explicitly or implicitly 
defined goals influence a decision maker‘s perception of problem elements, thus determining the 
likelihood and direction of framing effect.  Goals thus influence whether problem elements are 
perceived to be positive or negative.  McElroy & Seta opted to label frames as positive and negative 
in a way that maintains consistency with the literature, even though doing so meant the labels are 
somewhat contrary to logic.  Consistency with existing literature allows for a straightforward 
understanding and comparison of the results by those already familiar with similar problems.  In 
existing literature outcomes are described as being positively framed if the outcomes discuss 
increasing a commodity, while outcomes are described as being negatively framed if the outcomes 
discuss decreasing a commodity.  In describing the current theory of this thesis, existing language is 
maintained while acknowledging that the hedonic valence of an outcome is a fundamentally different 
thing.  Outcomes are of positive hedonic valence, or inherently desirable, if they describe results in a 
way that is consistent with a decision maker‘s goals, while outcomes are said to be of negative 
hedonic valence, or inherently undesirable, if they describe results in a way that is inconsistent with a 
decision maker‘s goals. 
 
In summary, the findings of the McElroy & Seta study are interesting, but somewhat restricted by 
language and a lack of logical equivalence amongst alternatives.  The ability to generalize the 
findings is also limited since their conclusions result from investigating just one problem of high 
structural similarity to the Asian disease problem.  In order to generalize the relationship between 
goals and problem framing, there is a need to conduct further studies using clarified language under a 
diversity of decision scenarios.  The present research manipulates goals within various decision 
scenarios in order to investigate the relationship between the goals explicitly defined for a decision 
maker and the valence of a problem frame; that is, this research claims that when the goal is to 
increase a desirable commodity, the usual framing effect appears; when the goal is to decrease a 
desirable commodity, a reverse framing effect appears; and when there is ambiguity in the direction 
of a goal, no framing effect is evident.   
 
It is therefore expected that participants will demonstrate a preference for risk-aversion when 
outcomes are consistent with goals and a preference for risk-seeking when outcomes are inconsistent 
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with goals; in other words, when goals are positive in nature, a regular framing consistent with 
existing literature will be demonstrated. 
Hypothesis 1a: When goals are to increase the stimulus, preferences of participants 
demonstrate a framing effect with greater preference for risk-aversion in the positive 
frame, and greater preference for risk-seeking in the negative frame 
 
Conversely, when goals are negative, the hedonic valences of the frames are reversed.  Participants 
are thus expected to demonstrate a preference for risk-seeking in the positive frame and risk-aversion 
in the negative frame; in other words, when goals are negative in nature, a reversed framing effect 
will be demonstrated. 
Hypothesis 1b: When goals are to decrease the stimulus, preferences of participants 
demonstrate a reversed framing effect with greater preference for risk-seeking in the 
positive frame, and greater preference for risk-aversion in the negative frame 
 
Lastly, when goals are not aligned with outcomes, decision makers lack a clear indication of which 
outcomes are more or less desirable and thus demonstrate uncertainty in their preferences. 
Hypothesis 1c: When goals are not clearly defined, preferences of participants do not 
demonstrate a framing effect 
3.2 Hedonic Tone of Stimulus 
Framing effects demonstrate that the valence through which problem content is described influences 
our perception and evaluation of the contained information; that is, the framing of a problem effects 
how we process information and ultimately our preferences in selecting amongst available options.  
Moreover, the previous section claims that goals play a critical role in influencing how we perceive 
the valence of information and the way in which equivalent information is perceived across different 
variants of a decision scenario.  The influence of goals on framing effects thus demonstrates that 
information doesn‘t exist independently; rather, it is context dependent and is influenced by the 
manner in which it is presented.  Whether desirable or undesirable elements are accentuated thus 
impacts our perceptions of problems, our evaluations of the available alternatives, and our willingness 




Slovic et al. (2007) have provided a theoretical framework supporting the idea that our affective 
impressions of a subject guide our judgment and decision making, explaining that we are influenced 
at a subconscious level without concern for the objective facts of the situation; that is, affective 
judgments, such as emotions and feelings, influence decision making in an intuitive manner through 
automatic processing that occurs without mindful thought.  In fact, it has been shown that people tend 
to prefer gambles that, on average, provide them with the greatest emotional satisfaction and that 
affective factors, rather than economic utilities, play a significant role in determining preferences 
(Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999).  That is, subjective emotional pleasure associated with outcomes, 
rather than just objective economic considerations, influence our judgment and decision making.  Our 
processing of information is thus directed not only by fact, but also the underlying desirability of the 
subject at hand; attribute framing, of course, provides evidence to support this view.  While risky-
choice framing and attribute framing have been separately defined by the literature, the interaction 
between the two types of framing effects has not been closely studied.  In fact, nearly all studies of 
the risky-choice framing effect have focused on problems containing stimuli that are desirable to the 
decision maker; that is, the focus of most research has been on such items as human lives, financial 
investments, and other desirable things (Levin et al., 1998).  Rarely have items of negative hedonic 
tone—such as murders, cockroaches, or debt—been explored.  In other words, existing research 
studying framing effects has not adequately investigated how perception of stimuli having negative 
hedonic tone might be valued differently from stimuli having positive hedonic value.  Consider a 
variation of the Asian disease problem, outlined in Figure 3.2, in which the subject is inherently 
negative; that is, the subject is rodent lives rather than human lives. 
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Figure 3.2 Rodent problem: a risky-choice framing problem containing negative stimuli 
Imagine that the government is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease which is spread by 
rodents.  On average, for every surviving rodent, one person will die of infection.  It is estimated that 
there are 600 diseased rodents in a certain region, thus putting 600 human lives at risk.  Two 
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume that the estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows: 
 
Positive Frame: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 diseased rodents will survive. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 diseased rodents will survive, and 
a 2/3 probability that no diseased rodents will survive. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Program C is adopted, 400 diseased rodents will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that no diseased rodents will die, and a 
2/3 probability that 600 diseased rodents will die. 
 
Which of the two programs would you favour? 
Source: Adapted from Tversky & Kahneman (1981) 
 
In the case of the rodent problem, the positive frame refers to an increase in the problem stimulus, 
while the negative frame refers to a decrease.  In the positive frame, participants can secure an 
outcome guaranteeing that 200 rodents will survive, or they may take a chance and instead pursue a 
2/3 probability that no rodents will survive at the risk of a 1/3 chance that 600 rodents will survive.  
Since the problem context defines rodents as being undesirable, our understanding of affect would 
suggest that respondents are likely to prefer avoiding the guarantee that 200 rodents will survive, and 
are instead likely to demonstrate a preference for the risky-choice.  Such a prediction is consistent 
with prospect theory, since participants would prefer the risky-choice when they have a choice 
between guaranteed undesirable outcome and a chance at a less undesirable outcome, although at the 
expense of a possible worse outcome.  That is, according to the value function of prospect theory, the 
curve on the negative side of the reference point is initially very steep and becomes flatter; that is, the 
possibility of avoiding the initial rodents is more valuable than the additional rodents are harmful.  
Prospect theory thus predicts that participants will opt for the risk-seeking alternative in the positive 
frame—since the negative valence of the stimulus results in the alternatives being interpreted on the 
negative side of the value function. 
 
Conversely, in the negative frame participants can secure an outcome guaranteeing that 400 rodents 
will die, or they may take a chance and instead pursue a 2/3 probability that 600 rodents will die, at 
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the risk of a 1/3 chance that no rodents will die.  In this case, a guarantee that 400 rodents will die is 
assumed to be somewhat desirable; therefore, outcomes should be evaluated on the positive side of 
the utility function.  That is, from the perspective of the decision maker, both options are technically 
positive relative to the reference point and should be evaluated on the concave region of the value 
function.  The risky-choice option thus offers an opportunity to eliminate more rodents at the possible 
expense of eliminating none; however, since the curve becomes flatter further up the curve, 
eliminating additional rodents becomes relatively less valuable.  As a result, prospect theory predicts 
that respondents will prefer to lock in success by selecting the sure-thing option since the possibility 
of losing guaranteed gains is more harmful than the additional possible gains are valuable.  That is, 
prospect theory predicts that decision makers will demonstrate a preference for the sure-thing option 
in order to secure the elimination of 400 rodents. 
 
While the literature has clearly demonstrated that a framing effect is observed when innocent lives are 
at risk, it is unclear if the same result will hold when those lives are associated with stimuli of 
negative connotation—such as rebels or debt.  Following from the hypotheses derived from the logic 
of goal consistency outlined in the previous section, it is natural to predict that reversing the valence 
of the problem stimulus should result in a reversal of the observed framing effect; that is, by reversing 
the valence of the primary stimulus the positive frame becomes negative and the negative frame 
becomes positive—leading to a reversal of results.   
 
It is thus proposed that when the primary stimulus of a decision problem is of positive hedonic value, 
participants will demonstrate a preference for risk-averse behaviour in the positive frame and risk-
seeking behaviour in the negative frame; in other words, when hedonic tone of a problem‘s primary 
stimulus is positive, a framing effect consistent with prospect theory and existing literature is 
observed.   
Hypothesis 2a:  When the hedonic value of a problem's primary stimulus is positive, 
participants demonstrate a framing effect with greater preference for risk-aversion in the 
positive frame, and greater preference for risk-seeking in the negative frame 
 
Conversely, when a problem‘s primary stimulus is negative, participants will demonstrate a 
comparative preference for risk-seeking behaviour in the positive frame and risk-aversive behaviour 
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in the negative frame; in other words, when hedonic tone of a problem‘s primary stimulus is negative, 
a reversed framing effect is observed.   
Hypothesis 2b:  When the hedonic value of a problem's primary stimulus is negative, 
participants demonstrate a framing effect with greater preference for risk-seeking in the 
positive frame, and greater preference for risk-aversion in the negative frame 
3.3 Past Performance 
Existing research clearly demonstrates that the presentation of a decision scenario influences the risk 
preference of a decision maker; that is, logically equivalent options presented in contrasting frames 
can lead to divergent preferences.  Moreover, the previously explained hypotheses claim that valence 
of goals and problem stimuli influence the likelihood and direction of framing effects.  This section 
explains that situational factors are likely to influence not only framing effects, but also the status quo 
bias. 
 
People learn and acquire knowledge by observing others within the context of social interactions and 
experiences (Bandura, 2001); that is, we learn new behaviour through observational learning, or by 
observing and replicating behaviours executed by others.  If we observe another person being 
rewarded for performing an action in a social situation, then we develop motivation to perform 
similar actions ourselves.  Similarly, if we observe another person being punished for an action, we 
develop motivation against performing similar actions.  Accordingly, people tend to behave in ways 
that are analogous with the behaviour of others within their social groups.  The specific situations we 
find ourselves in and the people we interact with thus determine the knowledge we acquire 
throughout our lives.  Recent advancements in neuroscience explain how we learn from the behaviour 
of others; mirror neurons, which discharge when a person performs or observes a particular action, 
are believed to be the mechanism through which we learn and imitate the actions of others.  By 
observing the actions of others, neurons representing that action are activated; that is, visual 
information of observed actions are translated into knowledge (Rizzolatt & Craighero, 2004).  In 
other words, neurons fire in the observer‘s brain as if the observer were the one performing the action.  
By mimicking the behaviour of others and internalizing their actions in our own mind, we can 
simulate the processes through which they perform actions, allowing us to understand why they are 
performing those actions and why they might choose to continue—or discontinue—such actions 
(Sommerville & Decety, 2006).  For example, perceiving whether or not past performance was 
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satisfactorily desirable would be a key element in deciding whether one should continue with similar 
actions or approach the scenario through an alternative approach. 
 
It has been previously explained that the status quo bias describes a tendency for decision makers to 
maintain current choice when confronted with the availability of new options (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988).  Typically, the status quo bias has been demonstrated through decision scenarios 
in which there are a set of available alternatives, with one option defined as the status quo.  It has 
been shown with relative consistency that participants exhibit a preference for the status quo option 
over the other available alternatives.  Existing research has not, however, fully accounted for the 
situations and contexts under which this general tendency may not hold true.  Past performance is an 
example of a situational variable which might influence the likelihood of a decision maker continuing 
with the status quo alternative (Odean, 1998, 1999).  Evaluating the past success of following the 
status quo, or alternatively the performance others have demonstrated by pursuing similar courses of 
action, is an important factor influencing whether the status quo alternative is selected amongst a 
variety of alternatives.  The present theory acknowledges that by recognizing past successes, we are 
able to make meaningful and successful decisions; in other words, it is through observing successful 
behaviour that we learn to pursue actions that are aligned with our goals.  By evaluating our own 
successes and the successes of others we are able to mimic the mechanisms through which success 
and satisfaction can be obtained; that is, by observing past successes we are able to imitate decisions 
and actions that lead to satisfying our goals.  It is thus natural that past performance will influence the 
likelihood of a decision maker selecting the status quo from amongst a variety of alternatives. 
Hypothesis 3: Preference for the status quo is positively correlated with past performance; 
that is, as performance increases, participants demonstrate greater preference for the 
status quo, and as performance decreases, participants demonstrate reduced preference for 
the status quo 
3.4 Problem Complexity 
While observable elements of decision scenarios, such as past performance, might influence the 
likelihood of a decision maker selecting the status quo alternative, the perceived complexity of a 
problem is also likely to influence a decision maker‘s preferences for the status quo alternative at a 
subconscious level.  The complexity of a decision scenario can most obviously be varied by 
manipulating the difficulty of perceiving relevant information described within the scenario; that is, 
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by increasing the difficulty of interpreting the description of the decision scenario or by increasing the 
number of alternatives to be selected amongst.  Since we are limited in our abilities to perceive, 
process, and remember information (Miller, 1956) , our ability to distinguish amongst such 
information decreases as the number of elements within a scenario increases.  While sequential 
decision making may not be as highly constrained by such limitations, intuitive decision making 
quickly becomes disadvantaged as it becomes increasingly difficult for us to evaluate a large quantity 
of information in a methodological manner due to an abundance of information requiring 
consideration.   
 
An important consideration for rational decision makers is whether the selected course of action is 
likely to lead to positive results; in quantifiable problems, a rational option would be one having 
positive expected value, whereas an irrational option would have negative expected value.  It is thus 
natural that rational decision makers should prefer alternatives having positive expected value over 
alternatives having negative expected value.  Of course, it is not always the case that the status quo 
alternative is a rational choice.  It is therefore expected that participants will demonstrate greater 
preference for the status quo when it is rational compared to when it is irrational. 
Hypothesis 4a: Participants demonstrate greater preference for the status quo when the 
status quo alternative has positive expected value compared to when the status quo 
alternative has negative expected value 
 
The number of alternatives to be chosen amongst is also likely to influence a decision maker‘s 
preference for the status quo.  Assuming that the status quo is rational, a decision maker is more 
likely to select the status quo when there are two options compared to when there are eight options.  
That is, since additional alternatives introduce a greater variety of potential outcomes, participants 
will demonstrate reduced preference for the status quo as the complexity of a decision scenario 
increases through an increase in the number of available alternatives. 
Hypothesis 4b: When the status quo alternative has positive expected value, participants 





If a decision maker does not possess the ability, patience, or resources to consider all the decision 
alternatives, then the decision maker will rely on social cues to assist with making judgments; that is, 
the existence of a status quo will act as a signal of such a choice being rational.  It is thus proposed 
that as the complexity of a decision scenario increases through an increase in the number of available 
alternatives, participants will demonstrate reduced rationality. 
Hypothesis 4c: As the number of available alternatives increases, participants demonstrate 





In order to investigate the influence of goals, hedonic tone, past performance, and complexity on 
framing effects and the status quo bias, the current research investigated numerous decision scenarios 
under a variety of situational manipulations.  This section explains the process through which the 
various decision scenarios were developed, followed by a summary of the survey structure and 
deployment procedure.  Lastly, this chapter will discuss the resulting data sets which permit testing of 
the previously defined theory and hypotheses. 
4.1 Questionnaire Design 
As is typical in research investigating cognitive biases, data to support the proposed hypotheses was 
collected using a survey-based experimental methodology.  Due to the large number of factors being 
studied, a relatively large sample size was required which made laboratory-based testing infeasible.  
Fortunately, past research has demonstrated that the results of decision making studies conducted 
using survey-based approaches are consistent with individual testing in laboratory environments 
(Wang et al., 2001).  Moreover, existing research has demonstrated that real and hypothetical 
decisions result in similar choices and are a legitimate means of studying real-world behaviour and 
uncovering meaningful trends in human decision making (Kuhberger et al., 2002; Wiseman & Levin, 
1996).  In this research, popular decision problems were selected from the literature and modified to 
investigate the influence of various situational factors on decision making.  The described problems 
were thus derived from established and well-accepted research.  Manipulations were applied to the 
existing problems in a way that attempted to maintain consistency amongst problem frames, while 
also creating distinctions which allowed for the influence of various factors to be investigated; that is, 
manipulations generated differences in the goals explicitly described for the decision maker, the 
hedonic tone of the problem stimulus, the past performance of the status quo, and the complexity of 
the problem scenario.  All studies used between-subject designs in which participants were presented 
with only one scenario for each problem. 
 
Data were collected by electronically distributing study questionnaires to participants.  Participants 
were invited to participate in the online study through an e-mail invitation; those who opted to 
participate were presented with a series of scenarios consisting of imagined situations and asked to 
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make decisions amongst predefined choice alternatives.  Two such studies occurred, Study I was the 
initial questionnaire which might be considered an exploratory study.  Study II was a revised and 
expanded questionnaire consisting of a greater number of decision scenarios.  While the results of 
Study I were meaningful, additional data were sought through Study II to strengthen findings through 
a greater variety of questions in some cases, and an expanded sample size in other cases. 
 
Study I consisted of eight questions.  Five questions focused on framing effects, with three explicitly 
manipulating the goals of the decision maker and two manipulating the hedonic valence of the 
problem's primary stimulus.  An additional two questions focus on the status quo bias, with one 
manipulating past performance, and one manipulating the number of available alternatives.  The final 
question focused on willingness to pay, which is not a focus of the current research and will not be 
further discussed in this thesis.  The questions contained in Study I are summarized in Table 4.1, and 
the complete set of questions is presented in Appendix D.   
Table 4.1 Summary of Study I questionnaire 
# Problem Type Manipulation Description 
1 Athlete Weight FE Goal increase vs. decrease vs. maintain weight 
2 Dots FE Goal increase red dots vs. increase blue dots 
3 Company Performance FE Goal improve vs. maintain performance 
4 Disease Outbreak FE Stimulus save human lives vs. save rodent lives 
5 Medical Treatment FE Stimulus patient survival vs. disease-free 
6 Portfolio Selection SQ Performance neutral vs. strong vs. weak performance 
7 Tokens SQ Complexity number of available alternatives varied 
8 Beverage Purchase WTP Stimulus quality of vendor 
Legend: FE = Framing Effect, SQ = Status Quo, WTP = Willingness-to-Pay 
 
Study II consisted of thirteen questions.  Six questions focused on framing effects, with two 
manipulating the goals of the decision maker and four manipulating the hedonic tone of the problem‘s 
primary stimulus.  An additional three questions focused on the status quo bias, with two questions 
manipulating past performance and one manipulating the complexity of available alternatives.  The 
final four questions focused on willingness to pay and are not discussed further.  The questions 




Table 4.2 Summary of Study II questionnaire 
# Subject Matter Type Manipulation Description 
1 Points FE Goal increase vs. decrease vs. maintain points 
2 Widgets FE Goal maximize vs. minimize widgets 
3 Disease Outbreak FE Stimulus save human lives vs. save rodent lives 
4 Sinking Ship FE Stimulus save tourists vs. save pirates 
5 Building Invasion FE Stimulus save residents vs. save rebels 
6 Medical Treatments FE Stimulus patient survival vs. disease-free 
7 Portfolio Selection SQ Performance neutral vs. strong vs. weak performance 
8 Business Strategy SQ Performance strong vs. weak performance 
9 Tokens SQ Complexity number of available alternatives varied 
10 Beverage Purchase WTP Stimulus quality of vendor 
11 Event Ticket Purchase WTP Stimulus reputability of seller 
12 Ring Purchase WTP Suspicion warned vs. not warned of suspicious behaviour 
13 Speaker Purchase WTP Suspicion warned vs. not warned of suspicious behaviour 
Legend: FE = Framing Effect, SQ = Status Quo, WTP = Willingness-to-Pay 
4.1.1 Goal Manipulation 
Goal manipulation questions explicitly defined the goal of the decision maker within the provided 
scenario, thus attempting to influence the participant‘s perceptions of the elements contained within 
the scenario and the process through which available alternatives were evaluated.  By modifying 
problem scenarios through the manipulation of goals, decision makers were provided with motivation 
to differently evaluate the alternatives provided in the positive and negative frames.  In total, five 
problems investigated the influence of goals on the framing effect—three in the first study and two in 
the second. 
Table 4.3 Summary of goal manipulation problems 
Study Problem Manipulation 
I (q1) Athlete Weight increase vs. decrease vs. maintain weight 
II (q1) Points increase vs. decrease vs. maintain points 
I (q2) Dots increase red dots vs. increase blue dots 
II (q2) Widgets maximize  vs. minimize widgets 
I (q3) Company Performance improve vs. maintain performance 
 
In the athlete weight problem, previously described in Figure 3.1, evaluations of weight were 
manipulated by informing participants that the goal was to increase, decrease, or maintain weight.  
The purpose of including this problem in Study I was to attempt to replicate the study originally 
conducted by McElroy & Seta (2007) which strongly concluded that the goals of a decision maker 
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influence the likelihood and direction of a framing effect.  The problem used a 3 x 2 (increase vs. 
decrease vs. maintain goal; positive vs. negative frame) factorial design. 
 
In Study II, a modified version of the athlete weight problem was presented to participants such that 
the scenario instructed participants to imagine that they were playing a game in which the goal was to 
either increase, decrease, or maintain their current point level; by changing the subject of the problem 
from weight to points the problem allowed the same hypotheses to be tested under a different (and 
somewhat generalized) context.   The purpose of the points problem was to determine if similar 
findings would result under less emotionally charged circumstances, thus strengthening the ability to 
generalize the interaction between goals and framing effect.  The problem used a 3 x 2 (increase vs. 
decrease vs. maintain goal; positive vs. negative frame) factorial design identical to that of the athlete 
weight problem. 
 
The dots problem, asked in Study I, was intended to provide further evidence of the influence of goals 
on decision making by outlining a scenario in which the decision maker was playing a game with a 
goal of either increasing the number of red dots or increasing the number of blue dots.  Positive 
outcomes were aligned with being desirable for red, while negative outcomes were aligned with being 
desirable for blue.  The problem used a 2 x 2 (increase red vs. increase blue goal; positive vs. negative 
frame) factorial design. 
 
In Study II, the widgets problem reworked the wording of the dots problem in order to improve 
clarity of the scenario.  Rather than discussing dots of differing colours (which proved to be confusing 
and difficult to analyze), the problem discussed widgets remaining or disappearing; the revised 
problem was thus more logically aligned with the Asian disease problem—in which human lives 
either persisted or perished.  The problem used a 2 x 2 (increase vs. decrease dots; positive vs. 
negative frame) factorial design consistent with the dots problem, except that the goal was to increase 
or decrease dots rather than to increase dots of different colours. 
 
The company performance problem, derived from a similar study conducted by McNeil, Pauker, Sox, 
& Tversky (1982), deviated from all other goal manipulation problems in that it was not a risky-
choice framing problem; instead, it was an attribute framing problem focusing on a choice between 
consulting firms in which the two options were not technically equivalent.  Options in the positive 
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frame were described in terms of the likelihood of achieving positive results, whereas options in the 
negative term were described in terms of the likelihood of achieving negative results.  The problem 
was further manipulated by providing participants with a goal to either increase performance or 
maintain performance.  The problem used a 2 x 2 (increase vs. maintain performance; positive vs. 
negative frame) factorial design consistent with the previous goal manipulation problems.  While the 
company performance problem was distinct in underlying structure, the focus was consistent to the 
previous problems in that it attempted to test for an interaction between goals and the existence of a 
framing effect. 
4.1.2 Stimulus Manipulation 
By modifying problem scenarios through the manipulation of the hedonic tone of the primary 
stimulus, the current research sought to confirm that regular framing effects would be evident when 
the primary stimulus of a problem was desirable, and that framing effects would be reversed when the 
primary stimulus was undesirable.  In total, six problems investigated the influence of hedonic 
valence of the problem stimulus on framing effects—two in Study I, followed by replications of those 
questions along with two new questions in Study II.  All of the hedonic tone manipulation problems 
used 2 x 2 (positive vs. negative stimulus; positive vs. negative frame) factorial designs. 
Table 4.4 Summary of stimulus manipulation problems 
Study Problem Manipulation 
I (q4) Disease Outbreak save human lives vs. save rodent lives 
II (q3) Disease Outbreak (revised) save human lives vs. save rodent lives 
II (q4) Sinking Ship save tourists vs. save pirates 
II (q5) Building Invasion save residents vs. save rebels 
I (q5) Medical Treatment patient survival vs. disease-free 
II (q6) Medical Treatment (replication) patient survival vs. disease-free 
 
The disease outbreak problem replicated a problem similar to the Asian disease problem in the 
positive stimulus case and introduced a manipulation to the original problem, described in Figure 3.1, 
in the negative stimulus case.  In the latter case the stimuli of human lives was replaced with rodent 
lives, thus requiring participants to make a decision regarding a comparatively undesirable stimulus.  
This investigation contrasts with existing research which tends to ask questions about items focusing 
on desirable items.  The problem was first investigated in Study I and a revised version of the 




The sinking ship and building invasion problems, both investigated in Study II, were somewhat 
analogous to the disease outbreak problem.  In the positive subject case, the sinking ship problem 
describes a situation in which a cruise ship has hit a sunken barge and the lives of tourists are at risk 
(Jou, Shanteau, & Harris, 1996; A. F. Simon, Fagley, & Halleran, 2004); meanwhile, in the negative 
subject case, the problem describes a similar situation in which a pirate ship has hit a sunken barge 
and the lives of pirates are at risk.  Similarly, the building invasion problem describes a scenario in 
which rebels are terrorizing the lives of innocent residents.  In the positive subject case, the problem 
focuses on the lives of the residents; meanwhile, in the negative subject case, the problem focuses on 
the lives of the rebels.  That is, some participants were provided with a scenario describing a situation 
in which the lives of innocent residents were at risk, while others were provided with a similar 
scenario describing a situation in which the lives of violent rebels were at risk.  As usual, in each 
case, participants were asked to make a decision between sure-thing and risky-choice options framed 
either positively or negatively.  By comparing responses to similar questions with the hedonic tone of 
the subject matter being manipulated, the present research investigated the influence of hedonic tone 
on framing effects. 
 
The medical treatment problem deviated from all other hedonic tone manipulation problems in that it 
was not a risky-choice framing problem; instead, it was an attribute framing problem focusing on a 
choice between medical treatments which were not technically equivalent (McNeil et al., 1982).  In 
the original study, outcomes in the positive frame were described in terms of the likelihood of 
survival, whereas outcomes in the negative frame were described in terms of the likelihood of death.  
The version of the problem presented in the current research used the regular survival and mortality 
language in the positive stimulus case; that is, the problem was considered positive since the problem 
focused on the stimulus of a human life.  Meanwhile, in the negative stimulus case, the problem 
shifted the language from survival to ‗cancer-free‘ and death to ‗cancer-returns‘; that is, the problem 
shifted the focus from human life to the existence of cancer.  In the positive stimulus case the problem 
thus focused on the positive element of human life, whereas in the negative stimulus case the problem 
focused on the negative element of cancer.  This problem was first presented to participants in Study I 
and an identical question was replicated in Study II.  While the medical treatment problem was 
distinct in underlying structure, the focus was consistent with the previously described problems in 
that it tested for an interaction between stimulus valence and the existence of a framing effect. 
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4.1.3 Performance Manipulation 
Two problems investigated the influence of past performance on selection of the status quo, one 
asking participants to select a strategy for a financial portfolio and another asking participants to 
select a corporate strategy; in both cases participants were provided with a status quo alternative and 
information describing past performance. 
 
The portfolio selection problem was derived from the seminal work on the status quo bias by 
Samuelson & Zeckhauser (1988).  The original problem described a situation in which participants 
were told that they had inherited a large sum of money from a relative and were asked how they 
would prefer to invest that money; a separate group of participants were provided with a similar 
situation in which a portfolio of cash and securities was inherited from a relative, and were then asked 
how they would choose to invest that money—the default option being to continue with the current 
arrangement.  The original research demonstrated that participants provided with a status quo tended 
to prefer maintaining the current decision rather than shifting to an alternative.  In the current research 
the problem was modified so that past performance was defined.  The problem was thus similar to the 
original, the difference being the addition of information describing the performance of the status quo 
alternative; more precisely, participants were provided with information regarding performance of the 
status quo in recent years relative to the market.  The problem used a 3 x 4 design, with performance 
varied across three levels (strong vs. weak vs. neutral) and the status quo alternative varied across the 
four alternatives. 
 
The business strategy problem, loosely based on the portfolio selection problem, described a situation 
in which a company president is asked to choose amongst corporate strategies.  Participants are told 
that past performance has either been relatively strong or weak relative to the market, and then asked 
to make a decision amongst possible strategies; with some participants informed of one of the 
alternatives being the status quo, and others not informed of a status quo.  The problem used a 2 x 4 
design (strong vs. weak performance; with the status quo alternative varied amongst the three 
alternatives as well as a no status quo case). 
4.1.4 Complexity Manipulation 
One problem manipulated complexity by varying the number of alternatives available to the decision 
maker.  Specifically, a rendition of the financial performance problem was created in which 
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participants were asked to maximize the number of tokens.  For each scenario, half of the available 
alternatives were rational (that is, had an expected value that was positive) while the remaining 
alternatives were irrational (that is, had an expected value that was negative).  Each participant was 
presented with a single version of the problem in which the number of available alternatives was 
predefined (being 2, 4, 6, or 8).  By varying the number of alternatives, results of the problem can be 
analyzed to investigate the relationship between problem complexity and selection of the status quo 
alternative, and also the relationship between problem complexity and selection of rational outcomes.  
The problem thus consisted of scenarios for each of four complexity levels, and for each complexity 
level there was a case for each potential status quo.  The problem thus consisted of twenty cases in 
total (2 + 4 + 6 + 8, respectively, for each level of complexity). 
4.2 Study Delivery 
Survey questionnaires were delivered online using the Sensus Web online interviewing system.  The 
online implementation of the survey was tested on a small group of graduate students at the 
University of Waterloo.  No technical problems were encountered, although minor changes were 
made to the implementation in order to improve clarity prior to releasing the study to the main study 
population.  The conducted studies received full ethics clearance through the Office of Research 
Ethics at the University of Waterloo, after which data were collected during the 2009 calendar year.  
Undergraduate students enrolled in second- and third-year Management Sciences courses at the 
University of Waterloo were invited to participate in an online survey for course credit.  Data 
collection occurred over three periods, thus allowing a data sample to be collected that is of relatively 
large size compared to other previously published survey-based studies investigating cognitive biases. 
 
Individuals were invited to participate through automatically generated personalized e-mails, 
presented in Appendix A, and in-class announcements.  All studies began with an introductory 
welcome letter, presented in Appendix B.  Students were first asked to consent to participation in the 
study, and then requested to provide preliminary background information including gender, academic 
term, academic faculty, and number of courses taken in disciplines related to the current research, as 
described in Appendix C.  Once the initial questionnaire was completed, respondents were presented 
with the study questions.  For each participant, the survey software presented the questions in a 
random order; moreover, for each question participants were randomly assigned to a scenario and the 
provided alternatives were also displayed in a random order.  Due to the random-generation of survey 
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components, it can be assumed that the possibility of any question- or answer-order effects has been 
eliminated. 
4.3 Data Samples 
Two data samples were collected over a period of three academic terms at the University of Waterloo.  
During the three periods, students enrolled in a total of five second- and third-year undergraduate 
management sciences courses were invited to participate in the research study for course credit.  An 
initial exploratory survey, referred to as Study I, was distributed to the first two groups of students to 
obtain an initial data set which was used to help refine and focus the research direction.  After the 
initial data set was finalized, an expanded survey, referred to as Study II, was distributed to an 
additional three groups of students in order to collect a second larger data set. 
 
Data for Study I was collected over two time periods.  The initial sample consisted of 195 responses 
collected from a third-year management sciences course during the Winter 2009 academic term.  Due 
to a technical problem with the survey delivery software, participants were not assigned evenly to 
problem scenarios thus making analysis of the data ineffective.  In order to fill voids in the data, an 
additional 42 responses were collected from a second-year management sciences course during the 
Spring 2009 academic term.  In total, 262 students were invited to participate (216 in the first group 
and 46 in the second); the final sample consisted of 237 responses, resulting in a participation rate of 
90.5%. 
 
Data for Study II was also collected over two time periods.  The initial sample was collected from a 
second-year management sciences course during the Spring 2009 academic term.  The remainder of 
the sample was collected from second- and third-year management sciences courses during the Fall 
2009 academic term.  Data were collected over two time periods in order to permit a large data set to 
be obtained; this was particularly necessary for the problems investigating the status quo bias since 
those problems consisted of a substantial number of cases to be compared.  In total, 654 students were 
invited to participate (241 in the first group and 413 in the second); the final data set consisted of 569 
responses (210 in the first group and 359 in the second), resulting in a participation rate of 87.0%.  
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4.4 Standards of Analysis 
The goal and stimulus manipulation problems consist primarily of risky-choice framing problems; the 
purpose of analyzing the results was to determine whether framing effects were evident for goals and 
stimuli having different valences.  In the literature, there exist two predominant methods used to 
describe the strength of the risky-choice framing effect which has been observed.  For the Asian 
disease problem, Tversky‘s & Kahneman (1981) demonstrated what has been labelled a choice 
reversal.  A choice reversal is said to occur when there is a statistically significant preference for one 
option in the positive frame and a statistically significant preference for the other option in the 
negative frame; that is, in the positive frame the preference for the risk-averse option is significantly 
greater than 50% and in the negative frame the preference for that same option is significantly less 
than 50%.  
 
The majority of follow-up studies have failed to replicate the existence of choice reversals in risky-
choice framing problems; in fact it has been said that the more a study differs from the original 
problem, the less likely a choice reversal will be observed (Kuhberger, 1998).  Many follow-up 
studies have, however, demonstrated a somewhat weaker result.  In studies where a full choice 
reversal is not observed, there is often still a relative tendency towards risk aversion in the positive 
frame and a relative tendency towards risk-seeking in the negative frame.  This shift in preference can 
be evaluated by testing for statistical significant difference between preferences in the positive frame 
compared to the negative frame.  This choice shift is thus a slightly weaker—but still statistically 
significant—result compared to a choice reversal.  In this research, statistical tests will seek to 
demonstrate that participants have demonstrated a choice shift across frames. 
 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b will be evaluated by testing for the existence of a statistically 
significant shift in preferences between positive and negative problem frames, whereas Hypothesis 1c 
will be supported if no such shift is evident.  While a lack of statistical significance cannot decisively 
prove a claim, it does provide evidence that framing effects have not appeared in those situations, 
which is supportive of Hypothesis 1c.  Analysis for all problems will be conducted using chi-squared 
analysis; the tests will compare the frequency of outcomes in the positive and negative frames in 





Hypothesis 3 will be investigated by testing for a statistically significant difference in preference 
between the status quo alternative and the other alternatives by comparing preferences between the 
strong and weak performance cases, with greater preference towards the status quo when past 
performance is strong compared to when past performance is weak. 
 
Hypothesis 4a will be investigated by testing for a statistically significant difference in preference for 
the status quo between the rational and irrational status quo cases, with greater preference towards the 
status quo when that option is rational compared to when the status quo is irrational.  Meanwhile, 
Hypothesis 4b will be investigated by testing for a statistically significant difference in preference for 
a rational status quo when the number of alternatives is low compared to when the number of 
alternatives is high.  Lastly, Hypothesis 4c will be investigated by testing for a statistically significant 
difference in preference for rational options as the number of alternatives varies, with greater 
preference towards rational options when the number of alternatives is low compared to when the 






Analysis and Results 
The current section summarizes and discusses the data collected through the previously described 
survey-based studies.  The results are used to investigate the influence of goals, problem stimuli, past 
performance, and problem complexity on the cognitive biases demonstrated by decision makers. 
5.1 Goal Manipulation 
Across the two studies, data were collected for a variety of problems investigating the influence of 
goals on decision making.  Results will be discussed for problems focusing on the following problem 
scenarios: athlete weight, points, dots, widgets, and company performance.  In all cases goals were 
described to either increase, decrease, or maintain the quantity of the primary element within the 
problem. 
5.1.1 Athlete Weight: Increase vs. Decrease vs. Maintain 
The athlete weight problem was a replication of the original study by McElroy & Seta (2007), and 
was presented to participants in Study I.  The problem consisted of three cases—one for each goal of 
increase, decrease, and maintain weight. 
Table 5.1 Goal effect: athlete weight 







Increase Positive 31 (79.5%) 8 (20.5%) 15.815 < 0.0001 
 Negative 13 (32.5%) 27 (67.5%)   
Decrease Positive 13 (32.5%) 27 (67.5%) 12.872 0.0003 
 Negative 30 (75.0%) 10 (25.0%)   
Maintain Positive 16 (41.0%) 23 (59.0%) 0.009 0.9234 
 Negative 16 (42.1%) 22 (57.9%)   
 
Results of the athlete weight problem proved to be consistent with those of the original study.  In the 
increase weight case, 79.5% of participants chose the risk-averse choice in the positive frame while 
only 32.5% chose risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 79] = 15.815, p < 0.0001).  
Conversely, in the decrease weight case only 32.5% of participants chose the risk-averse choice in the 
positive frame while 75.0% chose risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 80] = 12.872, p = 
0.0003).  A significant framing effect was thus demonstrated in the increase weight case while a 
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significant reversed framing effect was observed in the decrease weight case.  In the maintain weight 
case, no framing effect was observed with 41.0% of respondents preferring risk-aversion in the 
positive frame and 42.1% preferring risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 77] = 0.009, p = 
0.9234).  The athlete weight problem thus provides preliminary evidence in support of Hypotheses 1a, 
1b, and 1c. 
5.1.2 Points: Increase vs. Decrease vs. Maintain 
The points problem was derived from the weight problem and, once again, included three cases—to 
increase, decrease, or maintain the number of points.  The problem was presented to participants in 
Study II with the goal of investigating whether results equivalent to those of the athlete weight 
problem would be replicated when the stimulus was generalized to an item of lower practical 
importance to participants. 
Table 5.2 Goal effect: points 







Increase Positive 58 (55.8%) 46 (44.2%) 10.509 0.0012 
 Negative 28 (31.5%) 61 (68.5%)   
Decrease Positive 30 (35.3%) 55 (64.7%) 0.652 0.4195 
 Negative 43 (42.2%) 59 (57.8%)   
Maintain Positive 37 (38.9%) 58 (61.1%) 2.956 0.0856 
 Negative 24 (26.1%) 69 (73.9%)   
 
Results of the points program were somewhat weaker than for the athlete weight problem.  In the 
increase points case, 55.8% of participants chose the risk-averse choice in the positive frame while 
31.5% chose risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 193] = 10.509, p = 0.0012).  In the 
decrease points case only 35.3% of participants chose the risk-averse choice in the positive frame 
while 42.2% chose risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 187] = 0.652, p = 0.4195).  A 
framing effect was thus demonstrated in the increase points case, while there was no evidence of a 
framing effect in the decrease points case.  In the maintain points case, a weak framing effect was 
observed with 38.9% of respondents preferring risk-aversion in the positive frame and 26.1% 
preferring risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 187] = 2.956, p = 0.0856).  The points 
problem thus provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 1a, but no evidence in support of 
Hypotheses 1b and 1c. 
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5.1.3 Dots: Red vs. Blue 
The dots problem was presented to participants in Study I.  The problem consisted of two cases 
having opposite goals; in one case the goal was to maximize the number of red dots and in the other 
case the goal was to maximize the number of blue dots.  Since the outcomes were consistent across 
both goal cases, it was expected that a regular framing effect would be observed in one case and a 
reverse framing effect in the other case. 
Table 5.3 Goal effect: dots 
Goal Framing Treatment A Treatment B χ
2
 p 
Maximize red Positive 33 (57.9%) 24 (42.1%) 0.001 0.9794 
 Negative 33 (55.9%) 26 (44.1%)   
Maximize blue Positive 23 (39.7%) 35 (60.3%) 8.424 0.0037 
 Negative 42 (67.7%) 20 (32.3%)   
 
Results of the dots problem were somewhat ambiguous.  In the maximize red dots case, 57.9% of 
participants chose the risk-averse choice in the positive frame while 55.9% chose risk-aversion in the 
negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 116] = 0.001, p = 0.9794).  In the maximize blue dots case, 39.7% chose 
risk-aversion in the positive frame while 67.7% chose risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 
120] = 8.424, p = 0.0037).  There was thus no evidence of a framing effect in the case where the goal 
was to maximize red dots, while there was evidence of a framing effect in the case where the goal 
was to maximize blue dots.  The complex nature of this problem, which consisted of two different 
stimuli and goals that focused on differing stimuli, led to this inherent difficulty in interpreting the 
results.  In general, these results were somewhat unexpected, and no simple explanation could be 
derived to explain why the framing effect appeared when the goal was to increase red dots but not 
when the goal was to increase blue dots.   
5.1.4 Widgets: Maximize vs. Minimize 
The widgets problem was derived from the dots problem, and was presented to participants in Study 
II.  The problem attempted to correct the confusing nature of the dots problem by having the different 
goals focus on a single stimulus, thus allowing for more straightforward analysis and comparison of 
the results.  Two cases were presented to participants, one having a goal to maximize the number of 
widgets and the other having a goal to minimize the number of widgets. 
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Table 5.4 Goal effect: widgets 







Maximize Positive 78 (54.9%) 64 (45.1%) 8.510 0.0035 
 Negative 50 (36.8%) 86 (63.2%)   
Minimize Positive 49 (36.8%) 84 (63.2%) 0.053 0.8178 
 Negative 61 (38.9%) 96 (61.1%)   
 
In the maximize widgets case, 54.9% of participants demonstrated a preference for the risk-averse 
choice in the positive frame while 36.8% of participants chose risk-aversion in the negative frame 
(χ
2
[1, N = 278] = 8.510, p = 0.0035).  In the minimize widgets case, 36.8% of participants chose the 
risk-averse choice in the positive frame while 38.9% of participants chose risk-aversion in the 
negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 290] = 0.053, p = 0.8178).  There was thus strong evidence of a framing 
effect in the increase widgets case, while there was no evidence of a framing effect in the decrease 
widgets case.  The widgets problem thus provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 1a, but no 
evidence in support of Hypotheses 1b. 
5.1.5 Company Performance: Improve vs. Maintain 
The company performance problem asked participants to choose between two consulting firms, while 
defining the goal as to either increase or maintain performance of the company. 
Table 5.5 Goal effect: company performance 
Goal Framing Firm  A Firm B χ
2
 p 
Improve Positive 18 (31.6%) 39 (68.4%) 4.624 0.0315 
 Negative 8 (13.3%) 52 (86.7%)   
Maintain Positive 8 (14.3%) 48 (85.7%) 0.064 0.8000 
 Negative 8 (12.7%) 55 (87.3%)   
 
In the improve performance case, 31.6% of participants demonstrated a preference for Firm A in the 
positive frame while 13.3% of participants demonstrated a preference for Firm A in the negative 
frame (χ
2
[1, N = 117] = 4.624, p = 0.0315).  In the maintain performance case, preference for Firm A 
was 14.3% in the positive frame and 12.7% in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 119] = 0.064, p = 
0.8000).  Results thus demonstrated evidence of a framing effect in the improve performance case but 
no evidence of a framing effect in the maintain performance case.  The company performance 
problem thus provides evidence in support of Hypotheses 1a and 1c. 
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5.2 Stimulus Manipulation 
Across the two studies, data were collected for a variety of problems investigating the influence of 
stimulus valence on decision making.  For each question, cases were presented to participants where 
the primary stimulus was likely to be perceived as having positive hedonic tone or negative hedonic 
tone.  Problems discussed the following pairs of problem stimuli: people vs. rodents; tourists vs. 
pirates; residents vs. rebels; and survival vs. disease.  
5.2.1 Disease Outbreak: People vs. Rodents 
The disease outbreak problem consisted of two versions of a similar decision scenario, one in which 
the stimulus was people, and the other in which the stimulus was rodents. 
Table 5.6 Stimulus effect: disease outbreak 







People Positive 36 (62.1%) 22 (37.9%) 11.746 0.0006 
 Negative 17 (28.8%) 42 (71.2%)   
Rodents Positive 16 (27.1%) 43 (72.9%) 0.290 0.5903 
 Negative 20 (33.3%) 40 (66.7%)   
 
Results from Study I demonstrated that when the problem focused on people, 62.1% of participants 
opted for risk-aversion in the positive frame while 28.8% preferred risk-aversion in the negative 
frame (χ
2
[1, N = 117] = 11.746, p = 0.0006).  When the problem focused on rodents, 27.1% of 
participants preferred risk-aversion in the positive frame while 33.3% of participants preferred risk-
aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 119] = 0.290, p = 0.5903).  The disease outbreak problem 
thus provided very strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 2a, but no evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 2b. 
Table 5.7 Stimulus effect: disease outbreak (revised) 







People Positive 76 (51.7%) 71 (48.3%) 4.194 0.0406 
 Negative 52 (38.8%) 82 (61.2%)   
Rodents Positive 61 (44.5%) 76 (55.5%) 0.644 0.4222 
 Negative 73 (50.0%) 73 (50.0%)   
 
The disease outbreak problem was slightly reworded in Study II in order to improve consistency 
across the two cases.  Results from Study II demonstrated that when the problem focused on people, 
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51.7% of participants opted for risk-aversion in the positive frame while 38.8% of participants 
preferred risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 281] = 4.194, p = 0.0406).  When the problem 
focused on rodents, 44.5% of participants preferred risk-aversion in the positive frame while 50.0% of 
participants preferred risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 283] = 0.644, p = 0.4222).  The 
revised disease outbreak problem provided further evidence in support of Hypotheses 2a, but no 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 2b. 
5.2.2 Sinking Ship: Tourists vs. Pirates 
The sinking ship problem, presented in Study II, consisted of a similar design to the disease outbreak 
problem.  It consisted of two versions of a similar decision scenario, one in which the outcomes 
focused on the lives of tourists and the other in which the outcomes focused on the lives of pirates. 
Table 5.8 Stimulus effect: sinking ship 







Tourists Positive 62 (43.4%) 81 (56.6%) 3.321 0.0684 
 Negative 45 (32.1%) 95 (67.9%)   
Pirates Positive 66 (44.0%) 84 (56.0%) 0.040 0.8407 
 Negative 56 (42.1%) 77 (57.9%)   
 
Results demonstrated that when the problem focused on tourists, 43.4% of participants opted for risk-
aversion in the positive frame while 32.1% preferred risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 
283] = 3.321, p = 0.0684).  When the problem focused on pirates, 44.0% of participants preferred 
risk-aversion in the positive frame while 42.1% of participants preferred risk-aversion in the negative 
frame (χ
2
[1, N = 283] = 0.040, p = 0.8407).  The problem thus provided weak evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 2a, but no evidence in support of Hypothesis 2b. 
5.2.3 Building Invasion: Residents vs. Rebels 
The building invasion problem, presented in Study II, also consisted of a similar design to both the 
disease outbreak and sinking ship problems.  The problem again consisted of two versions of a similar 
decision problem, one in which the available outcomes focused on the lives of residents and the other 
in which the outcomes focused on the lives of rebels. 
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Table 5.9 Stimulus effect: building invasion 







Residents Positive 61 (46.4%) 70 (53.4%) 7.009 0.0081 
 Negative 44 (30.3%) 101 (69.7%)   
Rebels Positive 65 (44.5%) 81 (55.5%) 0.375 0.5404 
 Negative 58 (40.3%) 86 (59.7%)   
 
Results demonstrated that when the problem focused on residents, 46.4% of participants opted for 
risk-aversion in the positive frame while 30.3% preferred risk-aversion in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N 
= 276] = 7.009, p = 0.0081).  When the problem focused on rebels, 44.5% of participants preferred 
risk-aversion in the positive frame while 40.3% of participants preferred risk-aversion in the negative 
frame (χ
2
[1, N = 290] = 0.375, p = 0.5404).  The problem thus provided strong evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 2a, but no evidence in support of Hypothesis 2b. 
5.2.4 Medical Treatments: Survival vs. Disease 
The medical treatments problem asked participants to choose between two medical treatments, while 
describing the outcomes in terms of survival or mortality (in the positive stimulus case), and cancer-
free or cancer-returns (in the negative stimulus case). 
Table 5.10 Stimulus effect: medical treatments 
Subject Framing Treatment A Treatment B χ
2
 p 
Survival Positive 35 (57.4%) 26 (42.6%) 6.489 0.0109 
 Negative 20 (32.8%) 41 (67.2%)   
Disease Positive 17 (29.3%) 41 (70.7%) 1.720 0.1897 
 Negative 24 (42.9%) 32 (57.1%)   
 
In Study I, the results demonstrated that in the survival case, 57.4% of participants demonstrated a 
preference for Treatment A in the positive frame while 32.8% of participants demonstrated a 
preference for Treatment A in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 122] = 6.489, p = 0.0109).  In the disease 
case, preference for Treatment A was 29.3% in the positive frame and 42.9% in the negative frame 
(χ
2
[1, N = 114] = 1.720, p = 0.1897).  Results thus demonstrated evidence of a framing effect in the 
survival case but no evidence of a framing effect in the disease case, thus providing evidence in 





Table 5.11 Stimulus effect: medical treatments (replication) 
Subject Framing Treatment A Treatment B χ
2
 p 
Survival Positive 78 (54.2%) 66 (45.8%) 26.404 < 0.0001 
 Negative 38 (24.5%) 117 (75.5%)   
Disease Positive 41 (31.5%) 89 (68.5%) 0.720 0.3961 
 Negative 51 (37.2%) 86 (62.8%)   
 
The medical treatments problem was replicated in Study II.  In the survival case, 54.2% of 
participants preferred Treatment A in the positive frame and 24.5% of participants preferred 
Treatment A in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N = 299] = 26.404, p < 0.0001).  In the disease case, 
preference for Treatment A was 31.5% in the positive frame and 37.2% in the negative frame (χ
2
[1, N 
= 267] = 0.720, p = 0.3961).  Results again confirmed strong evidence of a framing effect in the 
survival case but no evidence of a framing effect in the disease case, thus providing very strong 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 2a but no support for Hypothesis 2b. 
5.3 Performance Manipulation 
Two problems manipulated past performance: the portfolio selection problem and the business 
strategy problem.  Both were problem scenarios consisting of a series of options, one of which was a 
defined status quo. 
5.3.1 Portfolio Selection 
The portfolio selection problem consisted of thirteen cases; one describing a scenario in which 
performance and status quo were not defined, and one for each combination of status quo and past 
performance level.  The basic case consisting of no manipulations was not central to the analysis, but 
was useful as a baseline to which the various manipulations could be immediately compared.  Table 
5.12 broadly summarizes the results of the thirteen cases of the portfolio selection problem.   
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 p A B C D 
Undefined None 22 (25.9%) 15 (17.6%) 34 (40.0%) 14 (16.5%) 86   
Strong A 29 (42.6%) 14 (20.6%) 19 (27.9%) 6 (8.8%) 68 25.437 0.0025 
 B 21 (29.6%) 30 (42.3%) 12 (16.9%) 8 (11.3%) 71   
 C 20 (30.8%) 13 (20.0%) 22 (33.8%) 10 (15.4%) 65   
 D 15 (23.8%) 16 (25.4%) 12 (19.0%) 20 (31.7%) 63   
Neutral A 29 (42.0%) 22 (31.9%) 11 (15.9%) 7 (10.1%) 69 13.015 0.1619 
 B 21 (33.3%) 17 (27.0%) 17 (27.0%) 8 (12.7%) 63   
 C 16 (26.2%) 18 (29.5%) 19 (31.1%) 8 (13.1%) 61   
 D 13 (19.7%) 19 (28.8%) 17 (25.8%) 17 (25.8%) 66   
Poor A 14 (23.3%) 20 (33.3%) 17 (28.3%) 9 (15.0%) 60 5.526 0.7863 
 B 19 (24.7%) 29 (37.7%) 20 (26.0%) 9 (11.7%) 77   
 C 23 (33.3%) 18 (26.1%) 17 (24.6%) 11 (15.9%) 69   
 D 14 (20.0%) 22 (31.4%) 18 (25.7%) 16 (22.9%) 70   
Notes: (1) bold entries define the status quo alternative 
(2) p-values test for a difference in preference within each of the performance scenarios 
 
In the strong performance scenario, there was strong evidence of a difference in preferences amongst 
the various status quo cases (χ
2
[9, N = 267] = 25.437, p = 0.0025).  In the neutral case, there was very 
weak evidence of difference amongst options (χ
2
[9, N = 259] = 13.015, p = 0.1619).  Meanwhile, in 
the poor performance case, there was no evidence of a difference amongst cases (χ
2
[9, N = 276] = 
5.526, p = 0.7863).  Initial analysis of the data thus suggests that past performance influenced the 
preferences of decision makers.  That is, when past performance was strong, participants 
demonstrated a significant difference in preferences amongst status quo cases; conversely, when past 
performance was poor, participants demonstrated no difference in preferences amongst status quo 
cases.  The results thus suggest that performance influenced the preferences participants demonstrated 
for the status quo, with participants demonstrating greater differences in preferences when 
performance was strong compared to when performance was poor.  Comparing across performance 
cases, it is worth noting that preference for the status quo was consistently higher when performance 
was strong compared to when performance was poor. 
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 P A B C D Total 
None 22 (25.9%) 15 (17.6%) 34 (40.0%) 14 (16.5%) 86   
A 72 (36.5%) 56 (28.4%) 47 (23.9%) 22 (11.2%) 197 9.813 0.0202 
B 61 (31.0%) 76 (38.6%) 49 (24.9%) 25 (12.7%) 211 12.335 0.0063 
C 59 (29.9%) 49 (24.9%) 58 (29.4%) 29 (14.7%) 195 3.013 0.3896 
D 42 (21.3%) 57 (28.9%) 47 (23.9%) 53 (26.9%) 199 10.072 0.0180 
Notes: (1) bold entries define the status quo alternative 
(2) p-values test for a difference in preference between status quo and no status quo cases 
 
Table 5.13 provides a summary of the results combined across performance cases; that is, cases 
consisting of the same status quo were combined.  In this analysis, the three performance cases 
(strong, neutral, and poor) were considered as three strata, or independent populations; when 
combined, the three cases represent all possible levels of performance and can thus be analyzed as a 
single sample in order to draw generalized conclusions from the data.  The chi-square analysis 
described in the table compares the preferences of decision makers when a status quo case is 
compared to the ‗no status quo‘ case; in three of the four cases a status quo effect was observed with 
comparatively greater preference for the status quo alternative compared to the no status quo case.  
Moreover, chi-square analysis comparing preferences across the four status quo cases concludes that 
there is very significantly likelihood (χ
2
[9, N = 802] = 31.519; p = 0.0002) that participants 
demonstrated a difference in preferences across the status quo cases.  The analysis demonstrates that, 
when the performance manipulations were removed from consideration, a regular status quo effect 
equivalent to the findings of existing literature was demonstrated by study participants. 
Table 5.14 Portfolio selection: influence of performance on preference for status quo 
Performance Status quo Non-SQ Total χ
2
 p 
Strong 101 (37.8%) 166 (62.2%) 267 6.157 0.0460 
Neutral 82 (31.7%) 177 (68.3%) 259   
Poor 76 (27.5%) 200 (72.5%) 276   
 
Table 5.14 compares preferences for the status quo with preference for non-status quo alternatives 
across the three performance scenarios; that is, data were aggregated in a way that allowed immediate 
comparison of the preferences for or against the status quo.  Participants demonstrated a statistically 
significant difference in preference amongst the three cases (χ
2
[2, N = 802] = 6.157, p = 0.04602); in 





[1, N = 543] = 6.082, p = 0.01366).  Results of the portfolio selection problem 
thus provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 3; that is, the analysis demonstrates that past 
performance was positively correlated with selection of the status quo alternative, with participants 
demonstrating greater preference for the status quo alternative when past performance was strong 
compared to when past performance was poor. 
5.3.2 Business Strategy 
The business strategy problem was a somewhat simplified performance manipulation problem, 
consisting of two performance levels and three potential alternatives. 







 P A B C 
Strong None 33 (49.3%) 17 (25.4%) 17 (24.4%) 67   
 A 37 (50.0%) 25 (33.8%) 12 (16.2%) 74 5.871 0.2090 
 B 28 (40.0%) 35 (50.0%) 7 (10.0%) 70   
 C 24 (35.3%) 29 (31.6%) 15 (22.1%) 68   
Weak None 29 (42.6%) 24 (35.3%) 15 (22.1%) 68   
 A 28 (35.0%) 30 (37.5%) 22 (27.5%) 80 3.187 0.5270 
 B 17 (24.3%) 37 (52.9%) 16 (22.9%) 70   
 C 21 (30.0%) 34 (48.6%) 15 (21.4%) 70   
Note: p-values test for a difference in preference between status quo cases 
 
Table 5.15 summarizes the basic findings; the chi-square analysis described in the table compares the 
three status quo cases within each of the two performance level; the no status quo cases were thus 
omitted from the analysis.  Neither the strong nor weak performance cases demonstrated a significant 
difference in preferences as the status quo was systematically manipulated. 






 p A B C 
None 62 (45.9%) 41 (30.4%) 32 (23.7%) 135   
A 65 (42.2%) 55 (35.7%) 34 (22.1%) 154 0.645 0.7243 
B 45 (32.1%) 72 (51.4%) 23 (16.4%) 140 11.397 0.0034 
C 45 (32.6%) 63 (45.7%) 30 (21.7%) 138 6.595 0.0370 
Note: p-values test for a difference in preference between status quo and no status quo cases 
 
Table 5.16 aggregates the results across performance levels by combining cases in which the status 
quo was equivalent.  The chi-square analysis described in the table compares each status quo case 
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against the no status quo case.  In two of the three cases, a difference in preferences existed between 
status quo and no status quo cases; however, in just one of the two cases was that difference due to 
increased preference for the status quo alternative.  Overall, there is minimal evidence of a difference 
in preferences across the three status quo cases (χ
2
[4, N = 432] = 7.267; p = 0.1224).  In general, it 
appears that the status quo effect was not evident in this problem. 
Table 5.17 Business strategy: influence of performance on preference for status quo 
Performance Status quo Non-SQ Total χ
2
 p 
Strong 87 (41.0%) 125 (59.0%) 212 0.807 0.3689 
Weak 80 (36.4%) 140 (63.6%) 220   
 
Table 5.17 compares preferences for the status quo with preference for non-status quo alternatives 
across the two performance scenarios, thus allowing immediate comparison of preference for or 
against the status quo.  There was no evidence of a difference in preference for the status quo when 
performance was strong compared to when performance was weak (χ
2
[1, N = 432] = 0.807; p = 
0.3689).  Analysis of the business strategy problem thus provides no evidence of a difference in 
preference for the status quo as performance was varied, and thus no support for Hypothesis 3.  While 
there was no evidence of performance influencing preferences, there was also a lack of evidence 
supporting the basic status quo effect commonly accepted by existing research.  There is little purpose 
of investigating the influence of past performance on the status quo effect when the status quo effect 
itself has not been found to influence preferences within the problem scenario. 
5.4 Complexity Manipulation 
The complexity problem consisted of twenty cases; for each level of complexity, there existed a case 
where each available alternative was described as the status quo.  Table 5.18 contains an aggregation 
of the data describing the number of times decision makers chose the status quo alternative or one of 
the other alternatives; the table also categorizes the results by whether or not the presented status quo 
was an economically rational alternative. 
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Table 5.18 Complexity: influence of status quo rationality on preference for status quo 
# 
Alternatives 
Rational SQ Irrational SQ   





 20 (20.4%) 28 (26.4%) 78 (73.6%) 55.576 < 0.0001 
4 30 (32.3%)
 a
 63 (67.7%) 13 (13.1%) 86 (86.9%) 9.023 0.0027 
6 11 (17.5%)
 b
 52 (82.5%) 16 (21.6%) 58 (78.4%) 0.156 0.6930 
8 12 (15.6%)
 b
 65 (84.4%) 12 (14.6%) 70 (85.4%) 0.028 0.8672 
Notes: (1) conditions with different subscripts were significantly different from each other 
(2) p-value test for a difference in preference between rational and irrational status quo cases 
 
Participants demonstrated a strong preference for the status quo in only one of the eight cases; 
specifically, 79.6% of participants preferred the status quo when that option was the only rational 
choice.  In all other cases a minority of participants continued with the status quo alternative, with 
more participants opting to switch than to maintain the current selection.  Comparing rational and 
irrational status quos, participants demonstrated significantly greater preference for a rational status 
quo over an irrational status quo in both the 2-alterantive (χ
2
[1, N = 204] = 55.576; p < 0.0001) and 4-
alternative cases (χ
2
[1, N = 192]
 
= 9.023; p = 0.0027); meanwhile, participants demonstrated no 
difference in preferences for the status quo in both the 6-alternative (χ
2
[1, N = 137]
 
= 0.156; p = 
0.6930) and 8-alternative cases (χ
2
[1, N = 159]
 
= 0.028; p = 0.8672).  In general, participants thus 
demonstrated a strong preference for a rational status quo compared to an irrational status quo in the 
2- and 4-alternative cases, but not in the 6- and 8-alternative cases.  The results provide support for 
Hypothesis 4a when the number of alternatives is low, but not as the number of alternatives increases.  
Moreover, when the status quo is rational, participants demonstrated comparatively greater preference 
for the status quo when the number of alternatives is low compared to when the number of 
alternatives is high, thus supporting Hypothesis 4b. 
Table 5.19 Complexity: influence of number of alternatives on rational choice 
 Choice    





 48 (23.5%) 204 27.798 < 0.0001 
4 132 (68.8%)
 a
 60 (31.3%) 192   
6 69 (50.4%)
 b





 67 (42.1%) 159   
Note: conditions with different subscripts were significantly different from each other  
 
Table 5.19 aggregates the data by combing across rational and irrational status quo cases; that is, the 
aggregated data ignores the influence of the status quo and simply compares preferences for rational 
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outcomes as the number of alternatives increases.  The results of the analysis demonstrate a very 
significant difference in preferences for rational options as the number of alternatives is varied (χ
2 
= 
27.798; p < 0.0001); that is, participants demonstrated greater rationality when the number of 
alternatives was low compared to when the number of alternatives was high, thus providing evidence 





Discussion and Conclusion 
The current chapter begins by summarizing the major findings of this thesis while discussing 
limitations and opportunities for future research.  Conclusions are then discussed while highlighting 
the importance of the findings in the context of the judgment and decision making literature. 
6.1 Discussion of Results 
The research pursued by this thesis manipulated contextual factors within structured decision 
scenarios; specifically, the research systematically manipulated goals, stimuli, past performance, and 
problem complexity in order to study the influence of contextual factors on decision making.  In this 
section the major findings of the conducted studies are summarized and discussed. 
6.1.1 Goal Manipulation 
Five problems investigated the interaction between goals and framing effects; that is, five problems 
sought to reveal a relationship between the goals defined within a decision scenario and the 
emergence of framing effects.  This research sought to show that when goals are consistent with 
available outcomes participants demonstrate a preference for risk-aversion, and when goals are 
inconsistent with available outcomes participants demonstrate a preference for risk-seeking.  In other 
words, framing effects are observed across positive and negative frames if clear goals exist to 
increase or decrease the item of interest within a decision problem.  Conversely, when goals do not 
support available outcomes, no framing effect is expected since participants lack a clear direction to 
support their choice between available alternatives.  Table 6.1 summarizes the p-values resulting from 
the chi-square analysis in each of the positive, negative, and neutral goal cases for each of the 
problem scenarios.  The p-values described in the table demonstrate the likelihood of there being a 
significant difference in preferences between the positive and negative frames for each combination 
of problem and goal.  Note that results of the dots problem have been excluded from the table since 
the complex nature of the underlying problem did not permit classification into the three goal 




Table 6.1 Summary of framing effect significance under goal manipulation 
  p-value for each goal 
Problem Study Positive Negative Neutral 
Weight 1 < 0.0001 0.0003 0.9234 
Points 2 0.0012 0.4195 0.0856 
Dots 1 complex problem structure 
Widgets 2 0.0035 0.8178 n/a 
Company Performance 1 0.0315 n/a 0.8000 
 Notes: (1) p-values test likelihood of a difference in preferences between problem frames 
  (2) bold entries are statistically significant at .05 level 
 
In the positive goal cases the results provide very strong support for Hypothesis 1a which claims that, 
when goals are positive, a framing effect will be observed with participants demonstrating a 
preference for risk-aversion in the positive frame and a preference for risk-seeking in the negative 
frame.  Participants demonstrated consistent preferences for risk-aversion in the positive frame and 
risk-seeking in the negative frame, resulting in significant framing effects consistent with the 
hypothesis in all four problems.  
 
Hypothesis 1b claims that, when goals are negative, a reversed framing effect will be observed with 
participants demonstrating a preference for risk-seeking in the positive frame and a preference for 
risk-aversion in the negative frame.  Three of the problems contained negative goal cases and only 
one such problem (the weight problem) demonstrated a significant reversed framing effect, while two 
problems (the points and widgets problems) provided no evidence of framing effects.  The results 
thus demonstrate very weak evidence in support of Hypothesis 1b. 
 
Hypothesis 1c claims that, when goals are not aligned with outcomes, a framing effect will not be 
evident.  Three of the four problems contained neutral goal cases, and two such problems (the weight 
problem and the company problem) demonstrated no evidence of a framing effect while one problem 
(the points problem) demonstrated weak evidence of a framing effect.  The results thus demonstrate 
relatively strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 1c. 
 
The current investigation of goal manipulations was intended to replicate the results previously 
established by McElroy & Seta (2007) in their study of the athlete weight problem.  Direct replication 
of the athlete weight problem did demonstrate strong results consistent with the original findings, 
while results of the company problem (which, notably, did not include a negative goal case) also 
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demonstrated similar, albeit slightly weaker, results.  The results of the other two goal manipulation 
problems (points and widgets) failed to reveal similar conclusions; specifically, in neither problem 
did a negative goal result in a reversed framing effect.  The findings demonstrate that, even when 
problems are structurally similarly, the specific wording and content of the scenarios can have a 
significant influence on the decisions made by participants. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the athlete weight and company problems studied highly salient 
scenarios which are likely natural for participants to imagine, while the stimuli of points and widgets 
may be somewhat less susceptible to goal manipulation.  Consider that weight and company 
performance are highly tangible concepts having real-world meaning and ramifications for 
participants; conversely, points and widgets are less tangible concepts likely having low salience and 
meaning to study participants.  To further elaborate, it is likely easy for participants to imagine 
scenarios in which they might want to increase, decrease, or maintain weight; similarly, it is easy for 
participants to imagine scenarios in which the goal of a company is to increase or maintain 
performance.  With regards to the points problem, it is natural for participants to imagine scenarios in 
which they would want to increase points; however, decreasing or maintaining points are much less 
natural goals.  That is, in nearly all real-world situations participants would want to increase points, 
while there are far fewer situations in which other point-related goals would exist.  Meanwhile, 
widgets are abstract items meant to exemplify generic objects, and are thus likely to be interpreted by 
participants in a similar way as points; not surprisingly, the results of the widgets problem were 
consistent with those of the points problem.  In previous research, Hsee & Rottenstreich (2004) 
acknowledge that it is the combination of quantitative and subjective valuations of stimuli which 
allows decision makers to determine value.  In fact, they demonstrate that participants are willing to 
donate more money to save endangered animals when the animals were represented through a 
pictorial representation of pandas compared to when they were represented by dots.  An affect-rich 
representation thus elicited a stronger degree of emotional response than an affect-poor 
representation. 
 
In summary, the results of the goal manipulation problem appear to have been influenced by the 
stimuli being discussed.  In problems where the stimuli were of high salience (specifically, the athlete 
weight and company performance problems), Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c were supported; conversely, 
in problems where stimuli were likely less salient to participants (specifically, points and widgets), 
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Hypothesis 1a was supported while Hypotheses 1b and 1c were not.  The results thus suggest that 
when stimuli are highly meaningful to participants, goals influence the likelihood and direction of 
framing effects; conversely, when stimuli lack meaning to participants, framing effects are only likely 
to occur when goals are positive, and not when goals are negative or neutral.  Goals thus have 
meaningful impact only when stimuli are highly salient, while the impact of goals diminishes when 
the content described within a decision scenario is neutral in nature.  The observed importance of the 
stimulus within the goal manipulation problems is particularly interesting considering that the second 
set of hypotheses of the current research investigate the influence of problem stimulus directly by 
manipulated the hedonic valence associated with the primary stimulus of decision problems. 
6.1.2 Stimulus Manipulation 
Six problems investigated the interaction between hedonic tone of problem stimuli and framing 
effects; notably, two problems from Study I were revised or replicated in Study II, thus resulting in 
four entirely unique problems across the two studies.  This research sought to demonstrate that when 
the hedonic tone of a problem‘s primary stimulus is positive, a regular framing effect is observed—as 
is commonly exhibited throughout existing literature.  Conversely, this research sought to 
demonstrate that when hedonic tone of the problem stimuli is negative, a reversed framing effect is 
observed—an idea that is novel to the literature.  Table 6.2 summarizes the resulting p-values in each 
of the positive and negative subject cases for each of the problem scenarios.  The p-values described 
in the table demonstrate the likelihood of there being a significant difference in preferences between 
the positive and negative frame for each of the combinations of problem and subject valence. 
Table 6.2 Summary of framing effect significance under stimulus manipulation 
  p-value for each subject 
Problem Study Positive Negative 
Disease Outbreak: people vs. rodents 1 0.0006 0.5903 
Disease Outbreak: people vs. rodents (revised) 2 0.0406 0.4222 
Sinking Ship: tourists vs. pirates 2 0.0684 0.8407 
Building Invasion: residents vs. rebels 2 0.0081 0.5404 
Medical Treatment: survival vs. disease 1 0.0109 0.1897 
Medical Treatment: survival vs. disease (replication) 2 < 0.0001 0.3961 
Notes: (1) p-values test likelihood of a difference in preferences between problem frames 
  (2) bold entries are statistically significant at .05 level 
 
Hypothesis 2a claimed that when the hedonic value of the stimulus is positive, as is typical in existing 
literature, a regular framing effect is expected, while Hypothesis 2b claimed that when the hedonic 
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value of the stimulus is negative, a reversed framing effect is expected.  In the positive stimulus cases, 
the results of all six problems demonstrated a significant framing effect consistent with expectations 
and consistent with existing literature (five at the .05 level, and one at the .10 level); thus providing 
very strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 2a.   
 
Conversely, in the negative stimulus cases, none of the six problems demonstrated a framing effect; 
results thus provided no evidence in support of Hypothesis 2b.  While it is well-accepted that framing 
effects exist when the focus of the scenario is positive (Kuhberger, 1998), existing research has not 
studied situations in which the outcomes at stake are of negative hedonic tone (Levin et al., 1998).  
The findings of the current research provide very strong evidence that when the outcome at stake is 
negative, framing effects do not appear. 
 
In order to explain why framing effects are evident when the problem stimulus is positive but not 
when the problem stimulus is negative, it is important to consider why the literature explain framing 
effects exist at all; that is, why do participants demonstrate a preference for risk-aversion when 
outcomes are perceived to be desirable and risk-seeking when outcomes are perceived to be 
undesirable?  According to prospect theory, when decision makers must choose between sure-thing 
and risky-choice outcomes that are positive, they tend to prefer to secure guaranteed gains rather than 
risk them for a chance at even greater gains.  Conversely, when decision makers have a choice 
between sure-thing and risky-choice outcomes that are negative, they prefer to take risks in hopes of 
avoiding losses, even though doing so introduces a chance of experiencing even greater losses; that is, 
the shape of the value function proposed by prospect theory suggests decision makers are risk-averse 
when considering positive outcomes and risk-seeking when considering negative outcomes.  When 
discussing desirable stimuli, prospect theory thus provides clear guidance as to the preferences we 
would expect to observe by decision makers; however, prospect theory is silent with respect to the 
shape of the value function when discussing undesirable stimuli.   
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, it is natural to assume that when considering negative stimuli, all 
outcomes should be reversed; however, the results of this research suggest that this prediction does 
not represent reality.  The prospect theory value function predicts risk-seeking in the negative frame 
because decision makers prefer to take chances to avoid losses; that is, when discussing negative 
outcomes decision makers possess an inherent goal to minimize pain, and they thus prefer alternatives 
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which allow the possibility of experiencing zero pain.  In the Asian disease problem, for example, 
participants take risks in hopes of achieving an outcome in which no life is lost and thus no pain is 
experienced (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  In the case of the current research, human behaviour in 
the negative stimuli cases was not aligned with the predictions of prospect theory; that is, in the 
rodents case of the disease outbreak problem, the result that emerged demonstrated that the possibility 
of eliminating all rodents was even more desirable than guaranteeing the elimination of some rodents, 
and so the predictions of prospect theory do not hold.  One logical possibility is that the negative 
affect associated with the negative stimuli overpowered the positive influence of the framing effect.  
For example, in the case of the rodents problem, it is possible that the only acceptable outcome was 
for all rodents to be eliminated, with anything less being unacceptable to the decision maker. 
 
Existing research has also argued that perceptions of risk are related to the degree to which a hazard 
evokes feelings of dread (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic 
et al., 2007); that is, while the guaranteed loss of human lives may be objectively worse than the 
existence of some rodents, it is not necessarily the case that the emotions that follow from hearing 
about these events are consistent.  Hearing about the deaths of people may evoke negative feelings; 
however, the thought of rodents spreading disease may be even more terrifying for an individual.  The 
risk perceived due to the rodents may thus be greater than the risk perceived due to human deaths.  It 
is well-accepted that events viewed as relatively desirable tend to be perceived as high value and low 
risk, whereas events viewed as relatively undesirable tend to be perceived as low value and high risk 
(Ganzach, 2000).  If items of negative hedonic tone, such as rodents or pirates, elicit greater degrees 
of fear, then participants would be expected to demonstrate greater risk-taking when such items are 
the focus of a decision.  In fact,  Rottenstreich & Hsee (2001) claim that the shape of prospect 
theory‘s value function is related to affective experience rather than simply psychological responses; 
that is, affect-rich outcomes evoke greater degrees of hope and fear than affect-poor outcomes, thus 
impacting willingness to take risk and resulting in a value function that is comparatively more s-
shaped. 
 
One additional aspect requiring attention when studying the influence of stimuli hedonic tone on 
decision making is that manipulating the stimuli may actually modify the underlying content of the 
decision scenario.  That is, while the positive and negative frames of a problem are logically 
equivalent, a question asking about rodent lives is inherently different from a similar question asking 
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about human lives.  For this reason, the statistical analysis in this research did not directly compare 
preferences between different variations of the same problem; instead, analysis occurred only 
between equivalent frames within the same scenario.  When comparing results across subject frames a 
focus was placed on general trends rather than individual results.  In order to respect this difference, 
an effort was made to ensure that scenarios to be compared were as consistent with one another as 
possible.  Problem scenarios were thus derived from established and well-accepted research, and 
attempts were made to apply manipulations in a consistent manner; that being said, due to the 
limitations of language it was not always possible to do so with perfect accuracy. 
6.1.3 Performance Manipulation 
Two problems, discussing portfolio selection and business strategy decisions, investigated the 
interaction between past performance and preference for the status quo.  This research sought to 
demonstrate that preference for the status quo is positively correlated with past performance; it was 
thus anticipated that as past performance increased so to would preference for the status quo 
alternative.  Results of the portfolio selection problem provided evidence in support of Hypothesis 3; 
that is, the analysis demonstrated that past performance was positively correlated with selection of the 
status quo alternative, with participants demonstrating increased preference for the status quo 
alternative as past performance increased.  The business strategy problem did not demonstrate 
evidence supporting a bias toward the status quo alternative whatsoever, therefore the relationship 
between performance and preference for the status quo could not be meaningfully investigated. 
 
In a practical sense, observations of past performance are surely to impact preferences.  It has been 
previously demonstrated in laboratory-based studies that participants are more likely to shift their 
portfolio allocation following a period of poorer performance than following a period of better 
performance (Moore, Kurtzberg, Fox, & Bazerman, 1999).  Conversely, analysis of market data has 
demonstrated that investors are more likely to sell their winning stocks and hold onto their losing 
stocks (Odean, 1998).  Moreover, when making purchase decisions, investors are more likely to buy 
securities which have recently experienced abnormally strong or abnormally poor performance, likely 
because those are the ones which attract attention amongst the diversity of options available within 
the market (Odean, 1999).  While existing laboratory and market studies have demonstrated the 
impact of performance on decision making, the current research intended to investigate the influence 
of past performance on status quo problems within the judgment and decision making literature.  The 
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current research demonstrates that by manipulating the description of past performance within the 
portfolio selection problem, preference for the status quo was influenced.   
 
The business strategy problem was designed to be similar to the portfolio selection problem; the 
intention was for the problem to be manipulated in such a way that it was not substantially different in 
structure, while allowing the hypothesis to be tested within a new context.  While the results of the 
business strategy problem were unable to demonstrate that past performance influenced preference 
for the status quo, they were able to reveal that the status quo bias itself may not be so clearly 
understood.  That is, while decision makers often demonstrate a bias towards the status quo 
alternative, it is not always the case that such a result holds true.  While the status quo bias 
unequivocally emerges in many real-world and experimental scenarios, it is certainly not evident in 
all situations, and cannot necessarily be assumed to be a fundamental law of human thought across all 
situations and contexts.  Further research is thus necessary to investigate the situations in which 
preference for the status quo is and is not influenced by performance. 
6.1.4 Complexity Manipulation 
One problem investigated the interaction between complexity and the status quo bias.  Hypothesis 4a 
claims that preference for the status quo should be greater when the status quo alternative has positive 
expected value compared to when it has negative expected value.  Meanwhile, Hypothesis 4b claims 
that when the status quo alternative is rational, preference for the status quo should decrease as the 
number of available alternatives increases.  The complexity problem provided strong evidence in 
support of Hypotheses 4a and 4b since preference for a status quo having positive expected value was 
high only when the number of alternatives was low; conversely, as the number of alternatives 
increased, preference for the status quo decreased.  Lastly, Hypothesis 4c claims that as the number of 
available alternatives increases, participants should demonstrate reduced preference for outcomes 
having positive expected value.  The complexity problem provided very strong evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 4c, as demonstrated by the decrease in preference towards options having positive 
expected value as the number of alternatives increased. 
 
It is of minimal surprise that complexity influences preference for the status quo and preference for 
rational outcomes.  Previous research has demonstrated that when decision makers must choose 
amongst a large number of potential alternatives, attention is drawn towards those options that stand 
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out in some way (Odean, 1999).  As the number of alternatives increases, it becomes less likely that 
decision makers will be able to evaluate all potential alternatives and therefore the likelihood of 
behaving irrationally increases; similarly, as the number of alternatives increases so does the number 
of potential options which may shift a decision maker‘s attention away from the status quo.  The 
purpose of the current study was to demonstrate the influence of complexity on decision making in 
survey-based experiments.   
 
While the question provided to participants was straightforward and the available alternatives could 
be evaluated and compared in a systematic way, the behaviour demonstrated by participants deviated 
from rationality and from the predictions of existing literature studying the status quo bias.  By 
varying the number of options the current study manipulated complexity in an obvious way, and the 
results demonstrated that such manipulations had a significant impact on preference for both the 
status quo and rational alternatives.  Future research investigating decision making might manipulate 
complexity of the underlying problems in more subtle ways, and such factors might influence the 
likelihood and strength of the resulting conclusions.  In future research, it might be interesting to 
further investigate the influence of problem complexity on preference for the status quo and on 
rational behaviour by manipulating the number of alternatives as well as the complexity of the 
problem scenario itself.  It might also be interesting to consider how problem complexity influences 
the likelihood of observing framing effects and other decision biases. 
6.2 Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis has been to investigate the influence of situational and contextual factors on the 
emergence of established decision biases.  More specifically, the current research investigates the 
influence of goals, problem stimuli, past performance, and problem complexity on the emergence of 
framing effects and the status quo bias.  Various decision scenarios were studied, with each consisting 
of numerous cases in which the aforementioned factors were systematically manipulated.  Problems 
were investigated using a survey-based experimental methodology in which participants were 
presented with a series of decision scenarios and asked to make a choice amongst pre-existing 
alternatives in each case.  All studies used between-subject designs and each participant was 
presented with only one case for each decision scenario.  Analysis of the results occurred by 
aggregating the responses of participants and comparing the responses of participants across different 
manipulations of the same scenario.  The results of the current research demonstrate that when the 
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hedonic valence of core elements and contextual background of decision problems are manipulated in 
systematic manners, existing biases do not necessarily emerge in the expected ways.  By evaluating 
how human decision making is influenced when problem scenarios are subject to various situational 
and contextual manipulations, this research contributes to our understanding of cognitive biases and 
suggests that there continues to exist opportunity to further develop established models of human 
decision making.  The current findings suggest that additional research must be conducted to refine 
our understanding of cognitive heuristics and biases in divergent situations and contexts. 
 
The results of the current research raise into question the ability of current theories to generalize to all 
decision scenarios.  The goal of this thesis has been to demonstrate that future research studying 
judgment and decision making must pay particular attention to the importance of situation and 
contexts on decision making.  While maintaining consistency across frames is critical, so too is 
ensuring that those factors held constant across frames do not influence decision makers and effect 
broader trends of decision making.  Ensuring that contextual factors do not have unanticipated and 
uncontrolled systematic influence on decision makers‘ perceptions and evaluations of decision 
alternatives is thus an important consideration in studying cognition.  In general, the current research 
suggests that there exist situations in which framing effects and the status quo bias do not necessarily 
hold.  Specifically, goals influence the direction of framing effects, but only if the subject under 
discussion is highly salient to the decision maker.  Moreover, framing effects emerge only in 
situations in which the stimuli under consideration has positive hedonic valence; when participants 
are asked to make decisions within scenarios focusing on stimuli having negative hedonic valence, 
framing effects fail to appear.  Future research must further investigate these findings under a robust 
series of scenarios; if these contextual effects, and perhaps others, hold true then existing models of 
human decision making, such as prospect theory, require further consideration.  The current research 
has also revealed that the status quo bias is influenced by past performance and the complexity of the 
decision scenario.  Future research must consider how the past experiences of the decision maker and 
information contained within the decision scenario might influence decision makers‘ evaluation of 
and preference amongst available alternatives; moreover, in situations where the problem scenario is 
complex, researchers must consider whether highly salient information contained within the scenario 




A core purpose of studying decision making is to improve our ability to make decisions by providing 
us with the knowledge to correct for the errors in judgment that result from the trust we naturally 
place on our intuition.  Throughout our lives we continually make decisions, and the choices we make 
determine the opportunities that await us in the moments that follow; specifically, the decisions we 
make determine the future situations we find ourselves in, and impact the options we have to select 
amongst.  The current research has demonstrated that those situations play an important role in 
shaping our lives; specifically, the goals we set, the issues we must deal with, the performance we 
observe, and the complexities that confront us are all factors that influence the way we process 
information and the decisions that lead us from one moment to the next.  This thesis was pursued to 
encourage greater emphasis on context and situation when studying human decision making, and the 
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You are invited to participate in a multiple-choice web-survey that concerns how people judge 
decision scenarios involving uncertain possibilities or events.  The survey will require approximately 
20 minutes of your time.  Complete responses will be compensated with a bonus 1% bonus mark 
added to your %CourseCode% final grade. 
 
We request that you complete the survey prior to %CompletionDate%.  To access the survey, click on 
the following URL: %URL%. 
 
Note that the above address is associated with your unique Student ID number, thus ensuring that 
your bonus marks are correctly recorded upon completing the survey. 
 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the 
Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, the final decision about 
participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this 
study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes at this office at 519-888-4567 Ext. 36005 or 
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Welcome to the study! 
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Dr. Rob Duimering 
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jaaycan@uwaterloo.ca 
 
You are invited to participate in a study that concerns how people make decisions in scenarios 
involving uncertain possibilities or events. 
 
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to make decisions in a series of unique situations.  
The questions focus on scenarios such as a disease outbreak, allocation of cash investments, 
willingness to purchase, and game strategy.  In addition, you will be asked to provide some 
background information about yourself such as academic term and gender. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary, and will take approximately 20 minutes of your time.  By 
volunteering for this study, you will learn about research in psychology and management sciences in 
general and the topic of this study in particular.  In addition, you will receive a 1% bonus mark in 
your management sciences 211 or 311 course.  There are no personal benefits to participation.  All 
information you provide is considered completely confidential; indeed, your name will not be 
included or in any other way associated with the data collected in the study.  Furthermore, because the 
interest of this study is in the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be 
identified individually in any way in any written reports of this research.  Data collected during this 
study will be retained indefinitely, in a locked office in the CPH building to which only researchers 
associated with this study have access.  There are no known or anticipated risks associated to 
participation in this study. 
 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the 
Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, the final decision about 
participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this 
study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes at this office at 519-888-4567 Ext. 36005 or 
ssykes@uwaterloo.ca. 
 






I agree to participate in a study being conducted by Jonathan Aycan and Dr. Rob Duimering of the 
Department of Management Sciences.  I have made this decision based on the information I have read 
in the Information-Consent Letter and have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I 
wanted about the study.  
 
I understand that this project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office 
of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo, and that I may contact this office if I have any 
concerns or comments resulting from my involvement in the study. 
 
I also agree to answer the questions of this study to the best of my ability, understanding that those 
participants who answer the questions honestly will be awarded a 1% bonus mark. 
 
□ I agree 





On the following pages, please indicate your choice for each of the decision questions.  Read each 
question carefully, and answer each individually without considering the information presented in any 
of the preceding questions.  
 
Note that if you must stop the survey, you will be able to resume at any time.  To return to the survey 






Background Information Questionnaire 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study. Please provide some background information 
about yourself before we begin. 
 




What is your academic term? 
 □ 1A 
 □ 1B 
 □ 2A 
 □ 2B 
 □ 3A 
 □ 3B 
 □ 4A 
 □ 4B 
 □ Other 
 
Which faculty are you in? 
 □ Applied Health Sciences 
 □ Arts 
 □ Engineering 
 □ Environment 
 □ Mathematics 
 □ Science 
 
Have you ever taken a course on statistics and/or probability, and if so, how many courses?  
None 1 2 3 4 5 or more 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Have you ever taken an economics course, and if so, how many courses? 
None 1 2 3 4 5 or more 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Are you currently enrolled in MSCI 211 or MSCI 311? 
 □ MSCI 211 
□ MSCI 311 
 
Prior to the current term, have you taken MSCI 211 (Organizational Behaviour)? 
 □ Yes 




Have you taken MSCI 452 (Decision Making Under Uncertainty)? 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 
Have you ever taken a psychology course (excluding MSCI 211 and MSCI 452), and if so, how many 
courses? 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 
Have you ever taken a psychology course (excluding MSCI 211 and MSCI 452), and if so, how many 
courses? 
None 1 2 3 4 5 or more 






Study I Questions 
Question 1: Athlete Weight 
 
Goal: increase weight 
Imagine that you are an athlete with the goal of increasing your weight as much as possible.  In your 
sport, the higher your weight the better you can perform.  You have to begin a specialized training 
program and you must choose between the following two options.  
 
Goal: decrease weight 
Imagine that you are an athlete with the goal of decreasing your weight as much as possible.  In your 
sport, the lower your weight the better you can perform.  You have to begin a specialized training 
program and you must choose between the following two options. 
 
Goal: maintain weight 
Imagine that you are an athlete with the goal of maintaining your weight as much as possible.  In your 
sport, you current weight is where you can perform best.  You have to begin a specialized training 
program and you must choose between the following two options. 
 
Positive Frame: 
If Program A is adopted, 20 pounds will be gained. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 60 pounds will be gained and a 2/3 
probability that no pounds will be gained. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Program A is adopted, 40 pounds will be lost. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that no pounds will be lost, and a 2/3 




Question 2: Dots 
 
Goal: maximize red 
Imagine you are playing a game in which your goal is to maximize the number of red dots.   
 
Goal: maximize blue 
Imagine you are playing a game in which your goal is to maximize the number of blue dots. 
 
You are preparing for an event which is expected to cause up to 40 red dots to turn blue.  Two 
alternative strategies to prepare for the event have been proposed.  Assume that the exact estimate of 
the consequences of the strategies are as follows: 
 
Positive Frame: 
If Strategy A is adopted, 10 red dots will remain red. 
If Strategy B is adopted, there is a 1/4 probability that 40 red dots will remain red, and a 3/4 
probability that no red dots will remain red. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Strategy C is adopted, 30 red dots will turn blue. 
If Strategy D is adopted, there is a 1/4 probability that no red dots will turn blue, and a 3/4 
probability that 40 red dots will turn blue. 
 




Question 3: Company Performance 
 
Goal: improve performance 
Imagine you are the president of a company.  In order to improve performance, you have decided to 
hire a consulting firm to help guide your organization.   
 
Goal: maintain performance 
Imagine you are the president of a company.  In order to ensure performance does not deteriorate, you 
have decided to hire a consulting firm to help guide your organization.   
 
Which of the following two consulting firms would you prefer? 
 
Positive Frame: 
Firm A:  Of 100 clients of firm A, 34 have positive results in the first month, 68 have positive 
results at the end of the first year, and 90 have positive results at the end of five years. 
 
Firm B:  Of 100 clients of firm B, 22 have positive results in the first month, 77 have positive 
results at the end of one year, and all have positive results at the end of five years. 
 
Negative Frame: 
Firm A:  Of 100 clients of firm A, 66 have negative results in the first month, 32 have 
negative results at the end of the first year, and 10 have negative results at the end of five 
years. 
 
Firm B:  Of 100 clients of firm B, 78 have negative results in the first month, 23 have 




Question 4: Disease Outbreak 
 
Stimulus: People 
Imagine that the government is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people.  Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.  
Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
 
Positive Frame: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will survive. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will survive, and a 2/3 
probability that no people will survive. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that no people will die, and a 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die. 
 
Stimulus: Rodents 
Imagine that the government is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
spread by rodents.  There are 600 diseased rodents in a certain region.  Two alternative programs to 
kill the diseased rodents have been proposed.  Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows: 
 
Positive Frame: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 diseased rodents will survive. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 diseased rodents will survive, and 
a 2/3 probability that no diseased rodents will survive. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Program C is adopted, 400 diseased rodents will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that no diseased rodents will die, and a 2/3 
probability that 600 diseased rodents will die. 
 




Question 5: Medical Treatment 
 
Imagine you are a doctor treating an elderly patient.  The patient has lived a good life; however, due 
to a series of major health problems, her quality of life has deteriorated in recent years.  She has now 
been diagnosed with lung cancer. 
 
Which of the following two treatment options would you recommend? 
 
Stimulus: survival 
Positive  Frame: 
Treatment A:  Of 100 people having treatment A, 90 will survive treatment, 68 will be alive 
after one year, and 34 will be alive after five years. 
 
Treatment B:  Of 100 people having treatment B, all will survive treatment, 77 will be alive 
after one year, and 22 will be alive after five years. 
 
Negative Frame: 
Treatment A:  Of 100 people having treatment A, 10 will die during treatment, 32 will have 
died by the end of one year, and 66 will have died by the end of five years. 
 
Treatment B:  Of 100 people having treatment B, none will die during treatment, 23 will have 




Treatment A:  Of 100 people having treatment A, 90 will be cancer-free after the treatment 
period, 68 will be cancer-free after one year, and 34 will be cancer-free after five years. 
 
Treatment B:  Of 100 people having treatment B, all will be cancer-free after the treatment 
period, 77 will be cancer-free after one year, and 22 will be cancer-free after five years. 
 
Negative Frame: 
Treatment A:  Of 100 people having treatment A, 10 will have seen the cancer return during 
treatment, 32 will have seen the cancer return by the end of one year, and 66 will have seen 
the cancer return by the end of five years. 
 
Treatment B:  Of 100 people having treatment B, none will have seen the cancer return 
during treatment, 23 will have seen the cancer return by the end of one year, and 78 will have 




Question 6: Portfolio Selection 
 
Scenario: neutral 
You are a serious reader of the financial pages but until recently have had few funds to invest.  That is 
when you inherited a large sum of money from your great uncle.  You are considering different 
portfolios.  Your choices are (check one): 
a. Invest in moderate-risk Company A.  Over a year‘s time, the stock has .5 chance of 
increasing 30% in value, a .2 chance of being unchanged, and a .3 chance of declining 20% in 
value 
b. Invest in high-risk Company B.  Over a year‘s time, the stock has a .4 chance of doubling in 
value, a .3 chance of being unchanged, and a .3 chance of declining 40% in value. 
c. Invest in treasury bills.  Over a year‘s time, these will yield a nearly certain return of 9%. 
d. Invest in municipal bonds.  Over a year‘s time, they will yield a tax-free return of 6%. 
 
Scenario: status quo 
You are a serious reader of the financial pages but until recently have had few funds to invest.  That is 
when you inherited a portfolio of cash and securities from your great uncle.  A significant portion of 
this portfolio is invested in moderate-risk Company A.   
 
Neutral Performance: 
[no performance indication] 
 
Positive Performance: 
Financial statements indicate that the portfolio has performed strongly relative to the market 
in recent years. 
 
Negative Performance: 
Financial statements indicate that the portfolio has performed poorly relative to the market in 
recent years. 
 
You are deliberating whether to leave the portfolio intact or to change it by investing in other 
securities.  (The tax and broker commission consequences of any changes are insignificant.)  Your 
choices are (check one):  
a. Retain the investment in moderate-risk Company A.  Over a year‘s time, the stock has .5 
chance of increasing 30% in value, a .2 chance of being unchanged, and a .3 chance of 
declining 20% in value 
b. Invest in high-risk Company B.  Over a year‘s time, the stock has a .4 chance of doubling in 
value, a .3 chance of being unchanged, and a .3 chance of declining 40% in value. 
c. Invest in treasury bills.  Over a year‘s time, these will yield a nearly certain return of 9%. 




Question 7: Tokens (2-alterantives) 
 
Scenario: neutral 
Imagine you are playing a game in which your goal is to maximize the number of red [blue] tokens.  
You are considering different strategies.  Your choices are (check one): 
a. Pursue Strategy A.  There is a 50% chance that 60 blue tokens will turn red, a 20% chance 
that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance that 40 red 
tokens will turn blue. 
b. Pursue Strategy B.  There is a 50% chance that 60 red tokens will turn blue, a 20% chance 
that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance that 40 blue 
tokens will turn red. 
 
Scenario: status quo 
Imagine you are playing a game in which your goal is to maximize the number of red [blue] tokens.  
You are considering different strategies.   
 
Neutral Frame: 
The last time you played the game you used moderate-risk strategy A 
 
Positive Frame: 




The last time you played the game you used moderate-risk strategy A and were not successful 
in the game. 
 
You are deliberating whether to maintain the current approach or to change it by pursuing another 
strategy.  Your choices are (check one):  
a. Continue with Strategy A.  There is a 50% chance that 60 blue tokens will turn red, a 20% 
chance that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance that 
40 red tokens will turn blue. 
b. Pursue Strategy B.  There is a 50% chance that 60 red tokens will turn blue, a 20% chance 
that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance that 40 blue 




Question 8: Beverage Purchase 
 
You are lying on the beach on a hot day.  For the past hour you have been thinking about how much 
you would enjoy a nice cold bottle of your favourite beverage.  A companion gets up to go make a 
phone call and offers to bring back a bottle of the beverage from the only nearby place where it is 
sold, [a resort hotel/an upscale resort hotel/a run-down resort hotel] (a grocery store/an upscale 
grocery store/a run-down grocery store).  He says that it might be expensive and so asks how much 
you would be willing to pay for it.  He says he will buy the beverage if it costs as much or less than 
the price you state, but if it costs more than the price you state he will not buy it.  You trust your 
friend, and there is no chance of bargaining with the [bartender] (store owner).  What price do you 
state? 
 





Study II Questions 
Question 1: Points 
 
Goal: increase points 
Imagine that you are playing a game with the goal of increasing your points as much as possible.  In 
the game, the higher your points, the better your score.  You have to select a strategy and you must 
choose between the following two options. 
 
Goal: decrease points 
Imagine that you are playing a game with the goal of decreasing your points as much as possible.  In 
the game, the lower your points, the better your score.  You have to select a strategy and you must 
choose between the following two options. 
 
Goal: maintain points 
Imagine that you are playing a game with the goal of maintaining your points at the current level as 
much as possible.  In the game, your current point level is ideal; that is, neither decreases nor 




If Strategy A is adopted, 20 points will be gained. 
If Strategy B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 60 points will be gained and a 2/3 
probability that no points will be gained. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Strategy A is adopted, 40 points will be lost. 
If Strategy B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that no points will be lost, and a 2/3 
probability that 60 points will be lost. 
 




Question 2: Widgets 
 
Goal: maximize widgets 
Imagine you are playing a game in which your goal is to maximize the number of widgets; that is, a 
greater number of widgets implies better performance. 
 
Goal: minimize widgets 
Imagine you are playing a game in which your goal is to minimize the number of widgets; that is, a 
fewer number of widgets implies better performance. 
 
You are preparing for an event which is expected to cause up to 40 widgets to disappear.  Two 
alternative strategies to prepare for the event have been proposed.  Assume that the exact estimate of 
the consequences of the strategies are as follows: 
 
Positive Frame: 
If Strategy A is adopted, 10 widgets will remain. 
If Strategy B is adopted, there is a 1/4 probability that 40 widgets will remain, and a 3/4 
probability that no widgets will remain. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Strategy C is adopted, 30 widgets will disappear. 
If Strategy D is adopted, there is a 1/4 probability that no widgets will disappear, and a 3/4 
probability that 40 widgets will disappear. 
 




Question 3: Disease Outbreak (revised from Study I) 
 
Imagine that the government is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease which is spread by 
rodents.  On average, for every surviving rodent, one person will die of infection.  It is estimated that 
there are 600 diseased rodents in a certain region, thus putting 600 human lives at risk.  Two 
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume that the estimates of the 




If Program A is adopted, 200 people will survive. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will survive, and a 2/3 
probability that no people will survive. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that no people will die, and a 2/3 




If Program A is adopted, 200 diseased rodents will survive. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 diseased rodents will survive, and 
a 2/3 probability that no diseased rodents will survive. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Program C is adopted, 400 diseased rodents will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that no diseased rodents will die, and a 2/3 
probability that 600 diseased rodents will die. 
 





Question 4: Sinking Ship 
 
Stimulus: tourists 
Tourists have increasingly been travelling the seas and vacationing on luxury cruise ships.  Imagine 
that a cruise ship hits a sunken barge and is sinking in the middle of the ocean.  There are 60 tourists 
on the ship, and their lives are in danger.  Two options are proposed.  Assume that the exact estimates 
of the consequences of the options are as follows: 
 
Positive Frame: 
If Option A is adopted, 20 tourists will be saved. 
If Option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 60 tourists will be saved and a 2/3 chance 
that none will be saved. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Option A is adopted, 40 tourists  will die. 
If Option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that no tourists will die, and a 2/3 chance that 60 
passengers will die. 
 
Stimulus: pirates 
Pirates have increasingly been travelling the seas and robbing unsuspecting shipping vessels.  
Imagine that a pirate ship hits a sunken barge and is sinking in the middle of the ocean. There are 60 
pirates on the ship, and their lives are in danger.  Two options are proposed.  Assume that the exact 
estimates of the consequences of the options are as follows: 
 
Positive Frame: 
If Option A is adopted, 20 pirates will be saved. 
If Option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 60 pirates will be saved and a 2/3 chance 
that none will be saved. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Option A is adopted, 40 pirates will die 
If Option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that no pirates will die, and a 2/3 chance that 60 
pirates will die. 
 




Question 5: Building Invasion 
 
Stimulus: residents 
Rebels have recently been terrorizing innocent civilians in acts of civil disobedience.  Imagine that 
rebels have entered a residential building and are holding families hostage.  There are 90 residents 
inside the building, and their lives are being threatened by the rebels.  Two options are proposed to 
save the residents: 
 
Positive Frame: 
If Option A is adopted, 30 residents will survive. 
If Option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 90 residents will survive and a 2/3 chance 
that none will survive. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Option A is adopted, 60 residents will die. 
If Option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that no residents will die, and a 2/3 chance that 
90 residents will die. 
 
Stimulus: rebels 
Rebels have recently been terrorizing innocent civilians in acts of civil disobedience.  Imagine that 
rebels have entered a residential building and are holding families hostage.  There are 90 rebels in the 




If Option A is adopted, 30 rebels will survive. 
If Option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 90 rebels will survive and a 2/3 chance that 
none will survive. 
 
Negative Frame: 
If Option A is adopted, 60 rebels will die. 
If Option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that no rebels will die, and a 2/3 chance that 90 
rebels will die. 
 




Question 6: Medical Treatment (same as Study I) 
 
Imagine you are a doctor treating an elderly patient.  Due to a series of major health problems, the 
patient's quality of life has deteriorated in recent years.  She has now been diagnosed with lung 
cancer. 
 
Which of the following two treatment options would you recommend? 
 
Stimulus: survival 
Positive  Frame: 
Treatment A:  Of 100 people having treatment A, 90 will survive treatment, 68 will be alive 
after one year, and 34 will be alive after five years. 
 
Treatment B:  Of 100 people having treatment B, all will survive treatment, 77 will be alive 
after one year, and 22 will be alive after five years. 
 
Negative Frame: 
Treatment A:  Of 100 people having treatment A, 10 will die during treatment, 32 will have 
died by the end of one year, and 66 will have died by the end of five years. 
 
Treatment B:  Of 100 people having treatment B, none will die during treatment, 23 will have 
died by the end of one year, and 78 will have died by the end of five years. 
 
Stimulus: disease 
Positive  Frame: 
Treatment A:  Of 100 people having treatment A, 90 will be cancer-free after the treatment 
period, 68 will be cancer-free after one year, and 34 will be cancer-free after five years. 
 
Treatment B:  Of 100 people having treatment B, all will be cancer-free after the treatment 
period, 77 will be cancer-free after one year, and 22 will be cancer-free after five years. 
 
Negative Frame: 
Treatment A:  Of 100 people having treatment A, 10 will have seen the cancer return during 
treatment, 32 will have seen the cancer return by the end of one year, and 66 will have seen 
the cancer return by the end of five years. 
 
Treatment B:  Of 100 people having treatment B, none will have seen the cancer return 
during treatment, 23 will have seen the cancer return by the end of one year, and 78 will have 




Question 7: Portfolio Selection (same as Study I) 
 
Scenario: neutral 
You are a serious reader of the financial pages but until recently have had few funds to invest.  That is 
when you inherited a large sum of money from your great uncle.  You are considering different 
portfolios.  Your choices are (check one): 
a. Invest in moderate-risk Company A.  Over a year‘s time, the stock has .5 chance of 
increasing 30% in value, a .2 chance of being unchanged, and a .3 chance of declining 20% in 
value 
b. Invest in high-risk Company B.  Over a year‘s time, the stock has a .4 chance of doubling in 
value, a .3 chance of being unchanged, and a .3 chance of declining 40% in value. 
c. Invest in treasury bills.  Over a year‘s time, these will yield a nearly certain return of 9%. 
d. Invest in municipal bonds.  Over a year‘s time, they will yield a tax-free return of 6%. 
 
Scenario: status quo 
You are a serious reader of the financial pages but until recently have had few funds to invest.  That is 
when you inherited a portfolio of cash and securities from your great uncle.  A significant portion of 
this portfolio is invested in moderate-risk Company A.   
 
Neutral Frame: 
[no performance indication] 
 
Positive Frame: 
Financial statements indicate that the portfolio has performed strongly relative to the market 
in recent years. 
 
Negative Frame: 
Financial statements indicate that the portfolio has performed poorly relative to the market in 
recent years. 
 
You are deliberating whether to leave the portfolio intact or to change it by investing in other 
securities.  (The tax and broker commission consequences of any changes are insignificant.)  Your 
choices are (check one):  
a. Retain the investment in moderate-risk Company A.  Over a year‘s time, the stock has .5 
chance of increasing 30% in value, a .2 chance of being unchanged, and a .3 chance of 
declining 20% in value 
b. Invest in high-risk Company B.  Over a year‘s time, the stock has a .4 chance of doubling in 
value, a .3 chance of being unchanged, and a .3 chance of declining 40% in value. 
c. Invest in treasury bills.  Over a year‘s time, these will yield a nearly certain return of 9%. 




Question 8: Business Strategy 
 
Scenario: neutral 
Imagine you are the president of a company.  In order to increase your company‘s value, you are 
considering various business strategies to guide the organization.   
 
Positive Performance: 




Recent annual reports indicate that the company has performed poorly relative to the market. 
 
Which of the following strategies would you prefer? 
a. Pursue moderate-risk Strategy A.  Over a year‘s time, the company has a 50% chance of 
increasing 30% in value, a 20% chance of being unchanged, and a 30% chance of declining 
20% in value 
b. Pursue high-risk Strategy B.  Over a year‘s time, the company has a 40% chance of doubling 
in value, a 30% chance of being unchanged, and a 30% chance of declining 40% in value. 
c. Pursue low-risk Strategy C.  Over a year‘s time, the company will nearly certainly increase 
9% in value. 
 
Scenario: status quo 
Imagine you are the president of a company.  In order to increase your company‘s value, you are 
considering various business strategies to guide the organization. 
 
Your company is currently following Strategy A. 
 
Positive Performance: 
Recent annual reports indicate that, while following Strategy A, the company performed 
strongly relative to the market. 
 
Negative Performance: 
Recent annual reports indicate that, while following Strategy A, the company performed 
poorly relative to the market. 
 
Which of the following strategies would you prefer? 
a. Continue with moderate-risk Strategy A.  Over a year‘s time, the company has a 50% chance 
of increasing 30% in value, a 20% chance of being unchanged, and a 30% chance of 
declining 20% in value 
b. Pursue high-risk Strategy B.  Over a year‘s time, the company has a 40% chance of doubling 
in value, a 30% chance of being unchanged, and a 30% chance of declining 40% in value. 
c. Pursue low-risk Strategy C.  Over a year‘s time, the company will nearly certainly increase 




Question 9: Tokens (4-alternatives; note: there were also 6- and 8-alterantive versions) 
 
Scenario: neutral 
Imagine you are playing a game in which your goal is to maximize the number of red [blue] tokens.  
You are considering different strategies.  Your choices are (check one): 
a. Pursue moderate-risk strategy A.  There is a 50% chance that 60 blue tokens will turn red, a 
20% chance that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance 
that 40 red tokens will turn blue. 
b. Pursue high-risk strategy B.  There is a 40% chance that 200 blue tokens will turn red, a 30% 
chance that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance that 
80 red tokens will turn blue. 
c. Pursue moderate-risk strategy C.  There is a 50% chance that 60 red tokens will turn blue, a 
20% chance that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance 
that 40 blue tokens will turn red. 
d. Pursue high-risk strategy D.  There is a 40% chance that 200 red tokens will turn blue, a 30% 
chance that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance that 
80 blue tokens will turn red. 
 
Scenario: status quo 
Imagine you are playing a game in which your goal is to maximize the number of red [blue] tokens.  
You are considering different strategies.   
 
Neutral Frame: 
The last time you played the game you used moderate-risk strategy A 
 
Positive Frame: 




The last time you played the game you used moderate-risk strategy A and were not successful 
in the game. 
 
You are deliberating whether to maintain the current approach or to change it by pursuing another 
strategy.  Your choices are (check one):  
a. Continue with moderate-risk strategy A.  There is a 50% chance that 60 blue tokens will turn 
red, a 20% chance that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% 
chance that 40 red tokens will turn blue. 
b. Pursue high-risk strategy B.  There is a 40% chance that 200 blue tokens will turn red, a 30% 
chance that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance that 
80 red tokens will turn blue. 
c. Pursue moderate-risk strategy C.  There is a 50% chance that 60 red tokens will turn blue, a 
20% chance that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance 
that 40 blue tokens will turn red. 
d. Pursue high-risk strategy D.  There is a 40% chance that 200 red tokens will turn blue, a 30% 
chance that the number of blue and red tokens will remain the same, and a 30% chance that 




Question 10: Beverage Purchase (revised from Study I) 
 
You are lying on the beach on a hot day.  For the past hour you have been thinking about how much 
you would enjoy a nice cold bottle of your favourite beverage.  A companion gets up to go make a 
phone call and offers to bring back a bottle of the beverage from the only nearby place where it is 
sold, [a resort hotel/an upscale resort hotel/a run-down resort hotel] (a grocery store/an upscale 
grocery store/a run-down grocery store).  He says that it might be expensive and so asks how much 
you would be willing to pay for it.  He says he will buy the beverage if it costs as much or less than 
the price you state, but if it costs more than the price you state he will not buy it.  You trust your 
friend, and there is no chance of bargaining with the [bartender] (store owner).  Last week you bought 
the same beverage for $5. 
 
What price do you state (in Canadian dollars)? 
 






Question 11: Event Tickets Purchase 
 
You have just learned that your favourite band is coming to town for a concert.  The cost of a ticket is 
$20.  Before you are able to purchase a ticket, you discover that the show has sold out.  There are, 
however, tickets available through a respectable [suspicious] charity auction that is reselling tickets 
[scalper who is reselling tickets].  Since the show is next week, this will be your only opportunity to 
purchase a ticket.   
 
Positive Frame: 
Through a respectable online marketplace that is reselling tickets for charity 
Through a respectable online marketplace that is reselling tickets for profit 
 
Negative Frame: 
Through a suspicious online marketplace that is reselling tickets for charity 
Through a suspicious online marketplace that is reselling tickets for profit 
 
Neutral Frame: 
Through an online marketplace that is reselling tickets for charity 
Through an online marketplace that is reselling tickets for profit 
 
Since the show is next week, this will be your only opportunity to purchase a ticket. 
 
What is the maximum amount you are willing to pay? 
 




Question 12: Ring Purchase 
 
As you walk through Paris taking photographs, you pass a person on the street who suddenly bends 
down a few steps behind you and picks up what appears to be a gold ring.  As he looks at what he has 
found, he notices you watching, and asks if you've lost a ring, to which you respond that you have 
not. 
 
At this point the person points out the hallmark which says '18k' on the inside of the ring.  The person 
then says that he has no use for the ring, and has no way to find the rightful owner.  He then asks you 
if you would like to purchase the ring from him. 
 
 Neutral: 
 [no warning] 
 
Warning: 
You have recently heard of situations in which people sell low-quality merchandise for higher 




How much are you willing to pay for the ring (in Canadian dollars)?  (If you are not willing to buy the 
ring, then enter ―0‖) 
   $ ________ 
 
Descriptive Approach: 
Assuming that you are willing to buy the ring, what price do you think you would be willing to pay 
(in Canadian dollars)?  
   $ ________ 
 
Do you think you would be willing to buy the ring in this situation? 
  Yes/No 
 




Question 13: Speaker Purchase 
 
You are walking through a parking lot by the mall when a commercial van, displaying a company 
logo on its side, pulls up next to you.  There are two individuals inside.  The driver informs you that 
he and his colleague work for a company that installs home audio systems.  They have just returned 
from a supplier's warehouse with an order of speakers that are to be installed for a client and, through 
a mistake of an operator at the warehouse, they were mistakenly provided with 10 speakers instead of 
the 8 that were purchased.  
 
They inform you that if they return to their workplace with all 10 speakers then it is unlikely that their 
boss will allow them to keep the extra speakers.  Consequently, they are eager to dispose of the 
speakers quickly and are willing to sell them to you for well below retail prices.  They show you a 
receipt clearly indicating that the speakers cost &#36;1200 each, and that 8 speakers were purchased 
from the supplier.  They also show you a brochure containing the specifications for the product, 
which appear quite impressive. 
 
 Neutral: 
 [no warning] 
 
Warning: 
You have recently heard of situations in which people sell low-quality merchandise for higher 




How much are you willing to pay for a pair of speakers (in Canadian dollars)?  (If you are not willing 
to buy the speakers, then enter ―0‖) 
   $ ________ 
 
Descriptive Approach: 
Assuming that you are willing to buy a pair of speakers, what price do you think you would be 
willing to pay in total for both (in Canadian dollars)? 
   $ ________ 
 
Do you think you would be willing to buy the speakers in this situation? 
  Yes/No 
 
Why or why not? 
 
